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Abstract
We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner’s Dilemma, and each
player observes a few of the partner’s past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing
related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types. The presence of
committed agents destabilizes previously proposed mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a
novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in various environments. Moreover, we
show that under an additional assumption of stationarity, this combination of strategies is essentially the
unique mechanism to support full cooperation, and it is robust to various perturbations. Finally, we extend
the results to a setup in which agents also observe actions played by past opponents against the current
partner, and we characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation.
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83. Keywords: Community enforcement; indirect reciprocity; ran-
dom matching; Prisoner’s Dilemma; image scoring.
1 Introduction
Consider the following example of a simple yet fundamental economic interaction. Alice has to trade with
another agent, Bob, whom she does not know. Both sides have opportunities to cheat, to their own benefit,
at the expense of the other. Alice is unlikely to interact with Bob again, and thus her ability to retaliate, in
case Bob acts opportunistically, is restricted. The effectiveness of external enforcement is also limited, e.g.,
due to incompleteness of contracts, non-verifiability of information, and court costs. Thus cooperation may
be impossible to achieve. Alice searches for information about Bob’s past behavior, and she obtains anecdotal
evidence about Bob’s actions in a couple of past interactions. Alice considers this information when she decides
how to act. Alice also takes into account that her behavior toward Bob in the current interaction may be
∗Affiliation: Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Israel. E-mail: yuval.heller@biu.ac.il.
†Affiliation: Department of Economics, Lund University, Sweden. E-mail: erik.mohlin@nek.lu.se.
‡A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Stable observable behavior.” We have benefited greatly from
discussions with Vince Crawford, Eddie Dekel, Christoph Kuzmics, Ariel Rubinstein, Larry Samuelson, Bill Sandholm, Rann
Smorodinsky, Rani Spiegler, Balázs Szentes, Satoru Takahashi, Jörgen Weibull, and Peyton Young. We would like to express
our deep gratitude to seminar/workshop participants at the University of Amsterdam (CREED), University of Bamberg, Bar Ilan
University, Bielefeld University, University of Cambridge, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Helsinki Center for Economic Research,
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel Institute of Technology, Lund University, University of Oxford, University of Pittsburgh,
Stockholm School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, NBER Theory Workshop at Wisconsin-Madison, KAEA session at the ASSA
2015, the Biological Basis of Preference conference at Simon Fraser University, and the 6th workshop on stochastic methods in
game theory at Erice, for many useful comments. Danial Ali Akbari provided excellent research assistance. Yuval Heller is grateful
to the European Research Council for its financial support (Starting Grant #677057). Erik Mohlin is grateful to Handelsbankens
forskningsstiftelser (grant #P2016-0079:1), the Swedish Research Council (grant #2015-01751), and the Knut and Alice Wallenberg
Foundation (Wallenberg Academy Fellowship #2016-0156) for their financial support. Last but not least, we thank Renana Heller
for suggesting the title.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
15
31
0v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  2
7 J
un
 20
20
observed by her future partners. Historically, the above-described situation was a challenge to the establishment
of long-distance trade (Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990; Greif, 1993), and it continues to play an important
role in the modern economy, in both offline (Bernstein, 1992; Dixit, 2003) and online interactions (Resnick and
Zeckhauser, 2002; Jøsang, Ismail, and Boyd, 2007).
Several papers have studied the question of how cooperation can be supported by means of community
enforcement. Most of these papers assume that all agents in the community are rational and, in equilibrium,
best reply to what everyone else is doing. As argued by Ellison (1994, p. 578), this assumption may be
fairly implausible in large populations. It seems quite likely that, in a large population, there will be at
least some agents who fail to best respond to what the others are doing, either because they are boundedly
rational, have idiosyncratic preferences, or because their expectations about other agents’ behavior are incorrect.
Motivated by this argument, we allow a few agents in the population to be committed to behaviors that do not
necessarily maximize their payoffs. It turns out that this seemingly small modification completely destabilizes
existing mechanisms for sustaining cooperation when agents are randomly matched with new partners in each
period. Specifically, both the contagious equilibria (Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994) and the “belief-free” equilibria
(Takahashi, 2010; Deb, 2012) fail in the presence of a small fraction of committed agents.1
Our key results are as follows. First, we show that always defecting is the unique perfect equilibrium,
regardless of the number of observed actions, provided that the bonus of defection in the underlying Prisoner’s
Dilemma is larger when the partner cooperates than when the partner defects. Second, in the opposite case,
when the bonus of defection is larger when the partner defects than when the partner cooperates, we present
a novel and essentially unique combination of strategies that sustains cooperation: all agents cooperate when
they observe no defections and defect when they observe at least two defections.2 Some of the agents also defect
when observing a single defection. Importantly, this cooperative behavior is robust to various perturbations,
and it appears consistent with experimental data. Third, we extend the model to environments in which an
agent also obtains information about the behavior of past opponents against the current partner. We show
that in this setup cooperation can be sustained if and only if the bonus of defection of a player is less than
half the loss she induces a cooperative partner to suffer. Finally, we characterize an observation structure that
allows cooperation to be supported as a perfect equilibrium outcome in all Prisoner’s Dilemma games. In all
observation structures we use the same essentially unique construction to sustain cooperation.
Overview of the Model Agents in an infinite population are randomly matched into pairs to play the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which each player decides simultaneously whether to cooperate or defect (see the
payoff matrix in Table 1). If both players cooperate they obtain a payoff of one, if both defect they obtain a
payoff of zero, and if one of the players defects, the defector gets 1 + g, while the cooperator gets −l, where
g, l > 0 and g < l + 1. (The latter inequality implies that mutual cooperation is the efficient outcome that
maximizes the sum of payoffs.)
Before playing the game, each agent privately draws a random sample of k actions that have been played
by her partner against other opponents in the past. The assumption that a small random sample is taken from
the entire history of the partner is intended to reflect a setting in which the memory of past interactions is long
1In contagious equilibria players start by cooperating. If one player defects at stage t, her partner defects at stage t+1, infecting
another player who defects at stage t + 2, and so on. In belief-free equilibria players are always indifferent between their actions,
but they choose different mixed actions depending on the signal they obtain about the partner. We discuss the non-robustness of
these classes of equilibria at the end of Section 4.2.
2As discussed later, our uniqueness results also rely on an additional assumption that agents are restricted to choose stationary
strategies, which depend only on the signal about the partner. As shown in Appendix A, all other results hold also in a standard
setup without the restriction to stationary strategies.
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Table 1: Matrix Payoffs of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
c d
c 1
1 −l 1+g
d 1+g
−l
0
0
g, l > 0 , g < l + 1
and accurate but dispersed. This means that the information that reaches an agent about her partner (through
gossip) arrives in a non-deterministic fashion and may stem from any point in the past.
We require each agent to follow a stationary strategy, i.e., a mapping that assigns a mixed action to each
signal that the agent may observe about the current partner. (That is, the action is not allowed to depend
on calendar time or on the agent’s own history.) A steady state of the environment is a pair consisting of: (1)
a distribution of strategies with a finite support that describes the fractions of the population following the
different strategies, and (2) a signal profile that describes the distribution of signals that is observed when an
agent is matched with a partner playing any of the strategies present in the population. The signal profile is
required to be consistent with the distribution of strategies in the sense that a population of agents who follow
the distribution of strategies and observe signals about the partners sampled from the signal profile will behave
in a way that induces the same signal profile.3
Our restriction to stationary strategies and our focus on consistent steady states allow us to relax the standard
assumption that there is an initial time zero at which an entire community starts to interact. In various real-life
situations, the interactions within the community have been going on from time immemorial. Consequently the
participants may have only a vague idea of the starting point. Arguably, agents might therefore be unable to
condition their behavior on everything that has happened since the beginning of the interactions.
We perturb the environment by introducing  committed agents who each follow one strategy from an
arbitrary finite set of commitment strategies. We assume that at least one of the commitment strategies is totally
mixed, which implies that all signals (i.e., all sequences of k actions) are observed with positive probability. A
steady state in a perturbed environment describes a population in which 1 −  of the agents are normal; i.e.,
they play strategies that maximize their long-run payoffs, while  of the agents follow commitment strategies.
We adapt the notions of Nash equilibrium and perfect equilibrium (Selten, 1975) to our setup. A steady
state is a Nash equilibrium if no normal agent can gain in the long run by deviating to a different strategy (the
agents are assumed to be arbitrarily patient). The deviator’s payoff is calculated in the new steady state that
emerges following her deviation. A steady state is a perfect equilibrium if it is the limit of a sequence of Nash
equilibria in a converging sequence of perturbed environments.4
3The reason why the consistent signal profile is required to be part of the description of a steady state, rather than being
uniquely determined by the distribution of strategies, is that our environment, unlike a standard repeated game, lacks a global
starting time that determines the initial conditions. An example of a strategy that has multiple consistent signal profiles is as
follows. The parameter k is equal to three, and everyone plays the most frequently observed action in the sample of the three
observed actions. There are three behaviors that are consistent with this population: one in which everyone cooperates, one in
which everyone defects, and one in which everyone plays (on average) uniformly.
4In Appendix D we show that all the equilibria presented in this paper satisfy two additional refinements: (1) evolutionary
stability (Maynard Smith, 1974) – any small group of agents who jointly deviate are outperformed, and (2) robustness – no small
perturbation in the distribution of observed signals can move the population’s behavior away from a situation in which everyone
plays the equilibrium outcome. In addition, most of these equilibria also satisfy the refinement of strict perfection (Okada, 1981)
– the equilibrium remains stable with respect to all commitment strategies.
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Summary of Results We start with a simple result (Prop. 1) that shows that defection is a perfect equilib-
rium outcome for any number of observed actions.
We say that a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is offensive if there is a stronger incentive to defect against a
cooperator than against a defector (i.e., g > l); in a defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma the opposite holds (i.e.,
g < l). Our first main result (Theorem 1) shows that always defecting is the unique perfect equilibrium in any
offensive Prisoner’s Dilemma game (i.e., g > l) for any number of observed actions. The result assumes a mild
regularity condition on the set of commitment strategies (Def. 3), namely, that this set is rich enough that,
in any steady state of the perturbed environment, at least one of the commitment strategies induces agents to
defect with a different probability than that of some of the normal agents. The intuition is as follows. The
mild assumption that not all agents defect with exactly the same probability implies that the signal that Alice
observes about her partner Bob is not completely uninformative. In particular, the more often Alice observes
Bob to defect, the more likely Bob will defect against Alice. In offensive games, it is better to defect against
partners who are likely to cooperate than to defect against partners who are likely to defect. This implies that
a deviator who always defects is more likely to induce normal partners to cooperate. Consequently, such a
deviator will outperform any agent who cooperates with positive probability.
Theorem 1 may come as a surprise in light of a number of existing papers that have presented various equi-
librium constructions that support cooperation in any Prisoner’s Dilemma game that is played in a population
of randomly matched agents. Our result demonstrates that, in the presence of a small fraction of committed
agents, the mechanisms that have been proposed to support cooperation fail, regardless of how these committed
agents play (except in the “knife-edge” case of g = l; see Dilmé, 2016 and Remark 7 in Section 4.3). Thus, our
paper provides an explanation of why experimental evidence suggests that subjects’ behavior corresponds nei-
ther to contagious equilibria (see, e.g., Duffy and Ochs, 2009) nor to belief-free equilibria (see, e.g., Matsushima,
Tanaka, and Toyama, 2013). The empirical predictions of our model are discussed in Appendix B.
Our second main result (Theorem 2) shows that cooperation is a perfect equilibrium outcome in any defensive
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (g < l) when players observe at least two actions. Moreover, there is an essentially
unique distribution of strategies that support cooperation, according to which: (a) all agents cooperate when
observing no defections, (b) all agents defect when observing at least 2 defections, (c) the normal agents defect
with an average probability of 0 < q < 1 when observing a single defection. The intuition for the result is as
follows. Defection yields a direct gain that is increasing in the partner’s probability of defection (due to the game
being defensive). In addition, defection results in an indirect loss because it induces future partners to defect
when they observe the current defection. This indirect loss is independent of the current partner’s behavior.
One can show that there always exists a probability q such that the above distribution of strategies balances the
direct gain and the indirect loss of defection, conditional on the agent observing a single defection. Furthermore,
cooperation is the unique best reply conditional on the agent observing no defections, and defection is the unique
best reply conditional on the agent observing at least two defections.
Next, we analyze the case of the observation of a single action (i.e., k = 1). Proposition 4 shows that
cooperation is a perfect equilibrium outcome in a defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma if and only if the bonus of
defection is not too large (specifically, g ≤ 1). The intuition is that similar arguments used to obtain the
result above imply that there exists a unique mean probability q < 1 by which agents defect when observing
a defection in any cooperative perfect equilibrium. This implies that a deviator who always defects succeeds
in getting a payoff of 1 + g in a fraction 1 − q of the interactions, and that such a deviator outperforms the
incumbents if g is too large.
4
Observations Based on Action Profiles So far we have assumed that each agent observes only the partner’s
(Bob’s) behavior against other opponents, but that she cannot observe the behavior of the past opponents against
Bob. In Section 5 we relax this assumption. Specifically, we study three observation structures: the first two
seem to be empirically relevant, and the third one is theoretically important since it allows us to construct an
equilibrium that sustains cooperation in all Prisoner’s Dilemma games.
1. Observing conflicts: Each agent observes, in each of the k sampled interactions of her partner, whether
there was mutual cooperation (i.e., no conflict: both partners are “happy”) or not (i.e., partners complain
about each other, but it is too costly for an outside observer to verify who actually defected). Such an
observation structure (which we have not seen described in the existing literature) seems like a plausible
way to capture non-verifiable feedback about the partner’s behavior.
2. Observing action profiles: Each agent observes the full action profile in each of the sampled interactions.
3. Observing actions against cooperation: Each agent observes, in each of the sampled interactions, what
action the partner took provided that the partner’s opponent cooperated. If the partner’s opponent
defected then there is no information about what the partner did.
It turns out that the stability of cooperation in the first two observation structures crucially depends on a
novel classification of Prisoner’s Dilemma games. We say that a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is acute if g > l+12 ,
and mild if g < l+12 . The threshold between the two categories, namely, g =
l+1
2 , is characterized by the fact
that the gain from a single unilateral defection is exactly half the loss incurred by the partner who is the sole
cooperator. Consider a setup in which an agent is deterred from unilaterally defecting because it induces future
partners to unilaterally defect against the agent with some probability. Deterrence in acute Prisoner’s Dilemmas
requires this probability to be more than 50%, while a probability of below 50% is enough to deter deviations
in mild PDs. Figure 1 (in Section 5.2) illustrates the classification of Prisoner’s Dilemma games.
Our next results (Theorems 3–4) show that in both observation structures (conflicts or action profiles, and
any k ≥ 2) cooperation is a perfect equilibrium outcome if and only if the underlying Prisoner’s Dilemma game
is mild. Moreover, cooperation is supported by essentially the same unique behavior as in Theorem 2. The
intuition for why cooperation cannot be sustained in acute games with observation of conflicts is as follows.
In order to support cooperation agents should be deterred from defecting against cooperators. As discussed
above, in acute games, such deterrence requires that each such defection induce future partners to defect with a
probability of at least 50%. However, this requirement implies that defection is contagious: each defection by an
agent makes it possible that future partners observe a conflict both when being matched with the defecting agent
and when being matched with the defecting agent’s partner. Such future partners defect with a probability of
at least 50% when making such observations. Thus the fraction of defections grows steadily, until all normal
agents defect with high probability.
The intuition for why cooperation cannot be sustained in acute games with observation of action profiles is
as follows. The fact that deterring defections in acute games requires future partners to defect with a probability
of at least 50% when observing a defection implies that when an agent (Alice) observes her partner (Bob) to
defect against a cooperative opponent, then Bob is more likely to do so because he is a normal agent who
observed his past opponent to defect than because Bob is a committed agent. This implies that Alice puts
a higher probability on Bob defecting against her if she observes Bob to have defected against a partner who
also defected than she does if she observes Bob to have defected against an opponent who cooperated. Thus,
defecting is the unique best reply when observing the partner defect against a defector, but it removes the
incentives required to support stable cooperation.
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Finally, we show that the third observation structure, observing actions against cooperation, is optimal in the
sense that it sustains cooperation as a perfect equilibrium outcome for any Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Theorem
5). The intuition for this result is that not allowing Alice to observe Bob’s behavior against a defector helps
to sustain cooperation because it implies that defecting against a defector does not have any negative indirect
effect (in any steady state) because it is never observed by future opponents. This encourages agents to defect
against partners who are more likely to defect (regardless of the values of g and l).
Conventional Model and Unrestricted Strategies In Appendix A, we relax the assumption that agents
are restricted to choosing only stationary strategies. We present a conventional model of repeated games with
random matching that differs from the existing literature only by our introducing a few committed agents. We
show that this difference is sufficient to yield most of our key results.
Specifically, the characterization of the conditions under which cooperation can be sustained as a perfect
equilibrium outcome (as summarized in Table 1 in Section 5.3) holds also when agents are not restricted to
stationary strategies, and even when agents observe the most recent past actions of the partner. On the other
hand, the relaxation of the stationarity assumption in Appendix A weakens the uniqueness results of the main
model in two respects: (1) rather than showing that defection is the unique equilibrium outcome in offensive
games, we show only that it is impossible to sustain full cooperation in such games; and (2) while a variant of
the simple strategy of the main model still supports cooperation when the set of strategies is unrestricted, we
are no longer able to show that this strategy is the unique way to support full cooperation.
Structure Section 2 presents the model. Our solution concept is described in Section 3. Section 4 studies the
observation of actions. Section 5 extends the model to deal with general observation structures. We discuss the
related literature in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7. Appendix A adapts our key result to a conventional
model with an unrestricted set of strategies. Appendix B discusses our empirical predictions. Appendix C
presents technical definitions. In Appendix D we present the refinements of strict perfection, evolutionary
stability, and robustness. The formal proofs appear in Appendix E. Appendix F studies the introduction of
cheap talk to our setup. The appendices are available online in the supplementary material.
2 Stationary Model
2.1 Environment
We model an environment in which patient agents in a large population are randomly matched in each round
to play a two-player symmetric one-shot game. For tractability we assume throughout the paper that the
population is a continuum.5 We further assume that the agents are infinitely lived and do not discount the
future (i.e., they maximize the average per-round long-run payoff). Alternatively, our model can be interpreted
as representing interactions between finitely lived agents who belong to infinitely lived dynasties, such that an
agent who dies is succeeded by a protégé who plays the same strategy as the deceased mentor, and each agent
observes k random actions played by the partner’s dynasty.
5The results can be adapted to a setup with a large finite population. We do not formalize a large finite population, as this
adds much complexity to the model without giving substantial new insights. Most of the existing literature also models large
populations as continua (see, e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985; Weibull, 1995; Dixit, 2003; Herold and Kuzmics, 2009; Sakovics
and Steiner, 2012; Alger and Weibull, 2013). Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) show that large finite populations differ from
infinite populations because only the former can induce contagious equilibria. However, as noted by Ellison (1994, p. 578), and as
discussed in Section 4.2, these contagious equilibria fail in the presence of a single “crazy” agent who always defects.
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Before playing the game, each agent (she) privately observes k random actions that her partner (he) played
against other opponents in the past. As described in detail below, agents are restricted to using only stationary
strategies, such that each agent’s behavior depends only on the signal about the partner, and not on the agent’s
own past play or on time. Thus, if all agents observe signals that come from a stationary distribution then
the agents’ behavior will result in a well-defined aggregate distribution of actions that is also stationary. We
focus on steady states of the population, in which the distribution of actions, and hence the distribution of
signals, is indeed stationary. In such steady states, the k actions that an agent observes about her partner
are drawn independently from the partner’s stationary distribution of actions. This sampling procedure may
be interpreted as the limit of a process in which each agent randomly observes k actions that are uniformly
sampled from the last n interactions of the partner, as n→∞.
To simplify the notation, we assume that the underlying game has two actions, though all our concepts
are applicable to games with any finite number of actions. An environment is a pair E = (G, k), where
G = (A = {c, d} , pi) is a two-player symmetric normal-form game, and k ∈ N is the number of observed actions.
Let pi : A×A→ R be the payoff function of the underlying game. We refer to action c (resp., d) as cooperation
(resp., defection), since we will focus on the Prisoner’s Dilemma in our results. Let ∆ (A) denote the set of
mixed actions (distributions over A), and let pi be extended to mixed actions in the usual linear way. We use the
letter a (resp., α) to denote a typical pure (mixed) action. With a slight abuse of notation let a ∈ A also denote
the element in ∆ (A) that assigns probability 1 to a. We adopt this convention for all probability distributions
throughout the paper.
2.2 Stationary Strategy
The signal observed about the partner is the number of times he played each action a ∈ A in the sample of k
observed actions. Let M = {0, ..., k} denote the set of feasible signals, where signal m ∈ M is interpreted as
the number of times that the partner defected in the sampled k observations.6
Given a distribution of actions α ∈ ∆ (A) and an environment E = (G, k), let να (m) be the probability of
an agent observing signal m conditional on being matched with a partner who plays on average the distribution
of actions α. That is, ν (α) := να ∈ ∆ (M) is a binomial signal distribution that describes a sample of k i.i.d.
actions, where each action is distributed according to α:
∀ (m) ∈M, να (m) = k! · (α (d))
m · (α (c))(k−m)
m! · (k −m)! . (1)
A stationary strategy (henceforth, strategy) is a mapping s : M → ∆ (A) that assigns a mixed action to each
possible signal. Let sm ∈ ∆ (A) denote the mixed action assigned by strategy s after observing signal m. That
is, for each action a ∈ A, sm (a) = s (m) (a) is the probability that a player who follows strategy s plays action
a after observing signal m. We also let a denote the strategy s that plays action a regardless of the signal, i.e.,
sm (a) = 1 for all m ∈ M . Strategy s is totally mixed, if for each action a ∈ A, and signal m ∈ M sm (a) > 0.
Let S denote the set of all strategies. Given strategy s and distribution of signals ν ∈ ∆ (M), let s (ν) ∈ ∆ (A)
be the distribution of actions played by an agent who follows strategy s and observes a signal sampled from ν:
∀a ∈ A, s (ν) (a) =
∑
m∈M
ν (m) · sm (a) .
6We do not allow agents to manipulate the observed signals. In our companion paper (Heller and Mohlin, 2016) we study a
related setup in which agents are allowed to exert effort in deception by influencing the signal observed by the opponent.
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2.3 Signal Profile and Steady State
Fix an environment and a finite set of strategies S. A signal profile θ : S → ∆ (M) is a function that assigns a
distribution of signals for each strategy in S. We interpret θs (m) as the probability that signal m is observed
when a partner playing strategy s is encountered. Let OS be the set of all signal profiles defined over S. Given
a strategy σ ∈ ∆ (S) and a signal profile θ ∈ OS , let θσ ∈ ∆ (M) be the average distribution of signals in the
population, i.e., θσ (m) :=
∑
s∈S σ (s) · θs (m).
We say that a signal profile θ : S → ∆ (M) is consistent with distribution of strategies σ ∈ ∆ (S) if
∀m ∈M, s ∈ S, θs (m) = ν (s (θσ)) (m) . (2)
The interpretation of the consistency requirement is that a population of agents who follow the distribution
of strategies σ and observe signals about the partners sampled from the profile θ have to behave in a way
that induces the same profile of signal distributions θ. Specifically, when Alice, who follows strategy s, is
being matched with a random partner whose strategy is sampled according to σ, she observes a random signal
according to the “current” average distribution of signals in the population θσ. As a result her distribution of
actions is s (θσ), and thus her behavior induces the signal distribution ν (s (θσ)). Consistency requires that this
induced signal distribution coincide with θs.
A steady state is a triple consisting of (1) a finite set of strategies S interpreted as the strategies that are
played by the agents in the population, (2) a distribution σ over S interpreted as a description of the fraction
of agents following each strategy, and (3) a consistent signal profile θ : S → ∆ (M). Formally:
Definition 1. A steady state (or state for short) of an environment (G, k) is a triple (S, σ, θ) where S ⊆ S is a
finite set of strategies, σ ∈ ∆ (S) is a distribution with full support over S, and θ : S → ∆ (M) is a consistent
signal profile.
When the set of strategies is a singleton, i.e., S = {s}, we omit the degenerate distribution assigning a mass
of one to s, and we write the steady state as a pair ({s} , θ) . We adopt this convention, of omitting reference to
degenerate distributions, throughout the paper.
A standard argument shows that any distribution of strategies admits a consistent signal profile (Lemma
1 in Appendix C). Some distributions induce multiple consistent profiles of signal distributions. For example,
suppose that k = 3, and everyone follows the strategy of playing the most frequently observed action (i.e.,
defecting iff m ≥ 2). In this setting there are three consistent signal profiles: one in which everyone cooperates,
one in which everyone defects, and one in which everyone plays (on average) uniformly7.
2.4 Perturbed Environment
As discussed in the Introduction, and as argued by Ellison (1994, p. 578), it seems implausible that in large
populations all agents are rational and know exactly the strategies played by other agents in the community.
Motivated by this observation, we introduce the notion of a perturbed environment in which a small fraction
of agents in the population are committed to playing specific strategies, even though these strategies are not
necessarily payoff-maximizing.
A perturbed environment is a tuple consisting of (1) an environment, (2) a distribution λ over a set of
commitment strategies SC that includes a totally mixed strategy, and (3) a number  representing the share
7In a companion paper (?) we study in a broader setup necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy distribution admitting
a unique consistent signal profile.
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of agents who are committed to playing strategies in SC (henceforth, committed agents). The remaining 1− 
share of the agents can play any strategy in S (henceforth, normal agents). Formally:
Definition 2. A perturbed environment is a tuple E =
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
, where G is the underlying game,
k ∈ N is the number of observed actions, SC is a non-empty finite set of strategies (called, commitment strategies)
that includes a totally mixed strategy, λ ∈ ∆ (SC) is a distribution with full support over the commitment
strategies, and  ≥ 0 is the mass of committed agents in the population.
We require SC to include at least one totally mixed strategy because we want all signals to be observed with
positive probability in a perturbed environment when  > 0. (This is analogous to the requirement in Selten,
1975, that all actions be played with positive probability in the perturbations defining a perfect equilibrium.)
Throughout the paper we look at the limit in which the share of committed agents, , converges to zero.
This is the only limit taken in the paper. We use the notation of O () (resp., O
(
2
)
) to refer to functions that
are in the order of magnitude of  (resp., 2), i.e., f() →→0 0 (resp., f()2 →→0 0).
We refer to
(
SC , λ
)
as a distribution of commitments. With a slight abuse of notation, we identify an
unperturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
,  = 0
)
with the equivalent environment (G, k).
Remark 1. To simplify the presentation, the definition of perturbed environment includes only commitment
strategies, and it does not allow “trembling hand” mistakes. As discussed in Remark 6 in Section 4.3, the results
also hold in a setup in which agents also tremble, as long as the probability by which a normal agent trembles
is of the same order of magnitude as the frequency of committed agents.
One of our main results (Theorem 1) requires an additional mild assumption on the perturbed environment
that rules out the knife-edge case in which all agents (committed and non-committed alike) behave exactly the
same. Specifically, a set of commitments is regular if for each distribution of actions α, there exists a committed
strategy s that does not play distribution α when observing the signal distribution induced by α. Formally:
Definition 3. A set of commitment strategies SC is regular if for each distribution of actions α ∈ ∆ (A), there
exists a strategy s ∈ SC such that sν(α) 6= α.
If the set of commitments is regular, then we say that the distribution
(
SC , λ
)
and the perturbed environment(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
are regular. An example of a regular set of commitments is the set that includes strategies
s ≡ α1 and s′ ≡ α2 that induce agents to play mixed actions α1 6= α2 regardless of the observed signal.
2.5 Steady State in a Perturbed Environment
Fix a perturbed environment E =
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
and a finite set of strategies SN , interpreted as the
strategies followed by the normal agents in the population. We redefine a signal profile θ : SC ∪ SN → ∆ (M)
as a function that assigns a binomial distribution of signals to each strategy in SC ∪ SN .
Given a distribution over strategies of the normal agents σ ∈ ∆ (SN) and a signal profile θ ∈ OSC∪SN ,
let θ((1−)·σ+·λ) ∈ ∆ (M) be the average distribution of signals in the population, i.e., θ((1−)·σ+·λ) (m) :=∑
s∈SC∪SN ((1− ) · σ +  · λ) (s) · θs (m). We adapt the definitions of a consistent signal profile and of a steady
state to perturbed environments. This straightforward adaptation is presented in detail in Appendix C.
The following example demonstrates a specific steady state in a specific perturbed environment. The example
is intended to clarify the various definitions of this section and, in particular, the consistency requirement. Later,
we revisit the same example to explain the essentially unique perfect equilibrium that supports cooperation.
Example 1. Consider the perturbed environment ((G, k = 2) , ({su ≡ 0.5}) , ), in which each agent observes
two of her partner’s actions, there is a single commitment strategy, denoted by su, which is followed by a fraction
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0 <  << 1 of committed agents, who choose each action with probability 0.5 regardless of the observed signal.
Let
(
S =
{
s1, s2
}
, σ =
( 1
6 ,
5
6
)
, θ
)
be the following steady state. The state includes two normal strategies: s1
and s2. The strategy s1 defects iff m ≥ 1, and the strategy s2 defects iff m ≥ 2. The distribution σ assigns a
mass of 16 to s1 and a mass of
5
6 to s2. The consistent signal profile θ is defined as follows (neglecting terms of
O
(
2
)
throughout the example):
θsu (m) =

25% if m = 0
50% if m = 1
25% if m = 2,
θs1 (m) =

1− 3.5 ·  if m = 0
3.5 ·  if m = 1
0 if m = 2
θs2 (m) =

1− 0.5 ·  if m = 0
0.5 ·  if m = 1
0 if m = 2.
(3)
To confirm the consistency of θ, we have first to calculate the average distribution of signals in the population:
θ((1−)·σ+·λ) (m) =

1− 1.75 ·  if m = 0
1.5 ·  if m = 1
0.25 ·  if m = 2.
Using θ((1−)·σ+·λ), we confirm the consistency of θs1 and θs2 (the consistency of θsu is immediate). We do so
by calculating distribution of actions played by a player following strategy si who observes the distribution of
actions of a random partner:
s1
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)
(c) = 1− 1.75 · 
s1
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)
(d) = 1.75 · 
s2
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)
(c) = 1− 0.25 · ,
s2
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)
(d) = 0.25 · .
Note that s1
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)
(d) = 1 − θ((1−)·σ+·λ) (2 · c) and s2
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)
(d) = θ((1−)·σ+·λ) (2 · d).
The final step in showing that θ is a consistent profile is the observation that each θsi coincides with the
binomial distribution that is induced by si
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)
.
2.6 Discussion of the Model
Our model differs from most of the existing literature on community enforcement in three key dimensions (see,
e.g., Kandori, 1992; Ellison, 1994; Dixit, 2003; Deb, 2012; Deb and González-Díaz, 2014). In what follows we
discuss these three key differences, and their implications on our results.
1. The presence of a few committed agents. If one removes the commitment types from our setup, then one
can show (by using belief-free equilibria, as in Takahashi, 2010) that: (1) it is always possible to support full
cooperation as an equilibrium outcome, and (2) there are various strategies that sustain full cooperation.
The results of this paper show that the introduction of a few committed agents, regardless of how they
behave, implies very different results: (1) defection is the unique equilibrium payoff in offensive Prisoner’s
Dilemmas (Theorem 1), and (2) there is an essentially unique strategy combination that supports a
cooperative equilibrium in defensive Prisoner’s Dilemmas. The intuition is that the presence of committed
agents implies that observation of past actions must have some influence on the likely behavior of the
partner in the current match (more detailed discussions of this issue follow Theorem 1 and Remark 10).
2. Restriction to Stationary Strategies. In our model we restrict agents to using stationary strategies that
condition only on the number of times they observed each of the partner’s actions being played in past
interactions. We allow agents to condition their play neither on the order in which the observed actions
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were played in the past, nor on the agent’s own history of play, nor on calendar time. The assumption
simplifies the presentation of the model and results. In addition, the assumption allows us to achieve
uniqueness results that might not hold without stationarity (as discussed in Section A.3).
3. Not having a “global time zero.” Most of the existing literature represents interactions within a community
as a repeated game that has a “global time zero,” in which the first ever interaction takes place. In many
real-life situations, the interactions within a community began a long time ago and have continued, via
overlapping generations, to the present day. It seems implausible that today’s agents condition their
behavior on what happened in the remote past (or on calendar time). For example, trade interactions
have been been taking place from time immemorial. It seems unreasonable to assume that Alice’s behavior
today is conditioned on what transpired in some long-forgotten time t = 0, when, say, two hunter-gatherers
were involved in the first ever trade. We suggest that, even though real-world interactions obviously begin
at some definite date, a good way of modeling what the interacting agents think about the situation may
be to get rid of global time zero and focus on strategies that do not condition on what happened in the
remote past. The lack of a global time zero is the reason why, unlike in repeated games, a distribution
of strategies does not uniquely determine the behavior and the payoffs of the agent, so that one must
explicitly add the consistent signal profile θ as part of the description of the state of the population.
It is possible to interpret a steady state (S, σ, θ) as a kind of initial condition for society, in which agents
already have a long-existing past. That is, we begin our analysis of community interaction at a point
in time when agents have for a long time followed the strategy distribution (S, σ) yielding the consistent
signal profile θ. We then ask whether any patient agent has a profitable deviation from her strategy. If
not, then the steady state (S, σ, θ) is likely to persist. This approach stands in contrast to the standard
approach that studies whether or not agents have a profitable deviation at a time t >> 1 following a long
history that started with the first ever interaction at t = 0.
In Appendix A we present a conventional repeated game model that differs from the existing literature in only
one key aspect: the presence of a few committed agents. In particular, this alternative model features standard
calendar time, and agents discount the future, observe the most recent past actions of the partner, and are not
limited to choosing only stationary strategies. We show that most of our results hold also in this setup. We
feel that this alternative model, while being closer to the existing literature than the main model, suffers from
added technical complexity that may hinder the model from being insightful and accessible.
3 Solution Concept
3.1 Long-Run Payoff
In this subsection we define the long-run average (per-round) payoff of a patient agent who follows a stationary
strategy s, given a steady state
(
SN , σ, θ
)
of a perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
. The same definition,
when taking  = 0, holds for an unperturbed environment.
We begin by extending the definition of a consistent signal profile θ to non-incumbent strategies. For
each non-incumbent strategy sˆ ∈ S\ (SN ∪ SC), define θ (sˆ) = θsˆ as the distribution of signals induced by a
deviating agent who follows strategy sˆ and observes the distribution of signals induced by a random partner in
the population (sampled according to (1− ) ·σ (s′) +  ·λ (s′)). That is, for each strategy sˆ ∈ S\ (S ∪ SC), and
each signal m ∈M , we define
θsˆ (m) =
(
ν
(
sˆ
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)))
(m) .
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We define the long-run payoff of an agent who follows an arbitrary strategy s ∈ S as:
pis
(
SN , σ, θ
)
=
∑
s′∈SN∪SC
((1− ) · σ (s′) +  · λ (s′)) ·
 ∑
(a,a′)∈A×A
sθ(s′) (a) · s′θ(s) (a′) · pi (a, a′)
 . (4)
Eq. (4) is straightforward. The inner (right-hand) sum (i.e.,
∑
(a,a′)∈A×A sθ(s′) (a) ·s′θ(s) (a′) ·pi (a, a′)) calculates
the expected payoff of Alice who follows strategy s conditional on being matched with a partner who follows
strategy s′. The outer sum weighs these conditional expected payoffs according to the frequency of each
incumbent strategy s′ (i.e., ((1− ) · σ (s′) +  · λ (s′))), which yields the expected payoff of Alice against a
random partner in the population.
Let pi (S, σ, θ) be the average payoff of the normal agents in the population:
pi
(
SN , σ, θ
)
=
∑
s∈SN
σ (s) · pis
(
SN , σ, θ
)
.
3.2 Nash and Perfect Equilibrium
A steady state is a Nash equilibrium if no agent can obtain a higher payoff by a unilateral deviation. Formally:
Definition 4. The steady state
(
SN , σ, θ
)
of perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
is a Nash equilibrium
if for each strategy s ∈ S, it is the case that pis
(
SN , σ, θ
) ≤ pi (SN , σ, θ).
Note that the 1−  normal agents in such a Nash equilibrium must obtain the same maximal payoff. That
is, each normal strategy s ∈ SN satisfies pis
(
SN , σ, θ
)
= pi
(
SN , σ, θ
) ≥ pis′ (SN , σ, θ) for each strategy s′ ∈ S.
However, the  committed agents may obtain lower payoffs.
A steady state is a (regular) perfect equilibrium if it is the limit of Nash equilibria of (regular) perturbed
environments when the frequency of the committed agents converges to zero. Formally (where the standard
definitions of convergence of strategies, distributions and states is presented in Appendix C):
Definition 5. A steady state (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) of the environment (G, k) is a (regular) perfect equilibrium if there exist
a (regular) distribution of commitments
(
SC , λ
)
and converging sequences
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
n
→n→∞ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗)
and (n > 0)n →n→∞ 0, such that for each n, the state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed
environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
. In this case, we say that (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) is a (regular) perfect equilibrium with
respect to distribution of commitments
(
SC , λ
)
. If θ∗ ≡ a , we say that action a ∈ A is a (regular) perfect
equilibrium action.
By standard arguments, any perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the unperturbed environment. In
Appendix C.4 we show that any symmetric (perfect) Nash equilibrium of the underlying game corresponds to
a (perfect) Nash equilibrium of the environment in which all normal agents ignore the observed signal.
3.3 Stronger Refinements of Perfect Equilibrium
In Appendix D we present three refinements of perfect equilibrium: strict perfection, evolutionary stability, and
robustness. The first refinement (strict perfection) is satisfied by the equilibria constructed in Proposition 1,
Theorem 2, and Theorem 3. The remaining refinements (evolutionary stability and robustness) are satisfied by
all the equilibria constructed in the paper.
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The notion of perfect equilibrium might be considered too weak because it may crucially depend on a specific
set of commitment strategies. The refinement of strict perfection (a` la Okada, 1981) requires the equilibrium
outcome to be sustained regardless of which commitment strategies are present in the population.
The notion of perfect equilibrium considers only deviations by a single agent (who has mass zero in the
infinite population). The refinement of an evolutionarily stable strategy (a` la Maynard Smith and Price, 1973)
requires stability against a group of agents with a small positive mass who jointly deviate.
The outcome of a perfect equilibrium may be non-robust in the sense that small perturbations of the
distribution of observed signals may induce a change of behavior that moves the population away from the
consistent signal profile. We address this issue by introducing a refinement that we call robustness, which
requires that if we slightly perturb the distribution of observed signals, then the agents still play the same
equilibrium outcome with a probability very close to one (in the spirit of the notion of Lyapunov stability).
4 Prisoner’s Dilemma and Observation of Actions
4.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Our results focus on environments in which the underlying game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (denoted by GPD),
which is described in Table 2. The class of Prisoner’s Dilemma games is fully described by two positive
parameters g and l. The two actions are denoted c and d , representing cooperation and defection, respectively.
When both players cooperate they both get a high payoff (normalized to one), and when they both defect they
both get a low payoff (normalized to zero). When a single player defects he obtains a payoff of 1 + g (i.e., an
additional payoff of g) while his opponent gets −l.
Table 2: Matrix Payoffs of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
c d
c 1
1 −l 1+g
d 1+g
−l
0
0
Prisoner’s Dilemma
GPD: g, l > 0 , g < l + 1
c d
c 1
1 −3 2
d 2
−3
0
0
Ex. 1: Defensive PD
GD: 1 = g < l = 3
c d
c 1
1 −1.7 3.3
d 3.3
−1.7
0
0
Ex. 2: Offensive PD
GO: 2.3 = g > l = 1.7
Following Dixit (2003) we classify Prisoner’s Dilemma games into two kinds: offensive and defensive.8 In an
offensive Prisoner’s Dilemma there is a stronger incentive to defect against a cooperator than against a defector
(i.e., g > l); in a defensive PD the opposite holds (i.e., l > g). If cooperating is interpreted as exerting high
effort, then the defensive PD exhibits strategic complementarity; increasing one’s effort from low to high is less
costly if the opponent exerts high effort.
4.2 Stability of Defection
We begin by showing that defection is a regular perfect equilibrium action in any Prisoner’s Dilemma game and
for any k. Formally:
8Takahashi (2010) calls offensive (defensive) Prisoner’s Dilemmas submodular (supermodular).
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Proposition 1. Let E = (GPD, k) be an environment. Defection is a regular perfect equilibrium action.
The intuition is straightforward. Consider any distribution of commitment strategies. Consider the steady
state in which all the normal incumbents defect regardless of the observed signal. It is immediate that this
strategy is the unique best reply to itself. This implies that if the share of committed agents is sufficiently
small, then always defecting is also the unique best reply in the slightly perturbed environment.
Our first main result shows that defection is the unique regular perfect equilibrium in offensive games.
Theorem 1. Let E = (GPD, k) be an environment, where G is an offensive Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e., g > l).
If (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) is a regular perfect equilibrium, then S∗ = {d} and θ∗ = k.
Sketch of Proof. The payoff of a strategy can be divided into two components: (1) a direct component: defecting
yields additional g points if the partner cooperates and additional l points if the partner defects, and (2)
an indirect component: the strategy’s average probability of defection determines the distribution of signals
observed by the partners, and thereby determines the partner’s probability of defecting. For each fixed average
probability of defection q the fact that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is offensive implies that the optimal strategy
among all those who defect with an average probability of q is to defect, with the maximal probability, against
the partners who are most likely to cooperate. This implies that all agents who follow incumbent strategies are
more likely to defect against partners who are more likely to cooperate. As a result, mutants who always defect
outperform incumbents because they both have a strictly higher direct payoff (since defection is a dominant
action) and a weakly higher indirect payoff (since incumbents are less likely to defect against them).
Discussion of Theorem 1 The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the assumption that agents are limited to
choosing only stationary strategies. The stationarity assumption implies that a partner who has been observed
to defect more in the past is more likely to defect in the current match. However, this may no longer be true
in a non-stationary environment. In Appendix A we analyze the classic setup of repeated games, in which
agents can choose non-stationary strategies and observe the opponent’s recent actions. In that setup we are
able to prove a weaker version of Theorem 1 (namely, Theorem 6) which states that full cooperation cannot be
supported as a perfect equilibrium outcome in offensive Prisoner’s Dilemmas (i.e., cooperation is not a perfect
equilibrium action in offensive games).
Several papers in the existing literature present various mechanisms to support cooperation in any Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Kandori (1992, Theorem 1) and Ellison (1994) show that in large finite populations cooperation
can be supported by contagious equilibria even when an agent does not observe any signal about her partner
(i.e., k = 0). In these equilibria each agent starts the game by cooperating, but she starts defecting forever
as soon as any partner has defected against her. As pointed out by Ellison (1994, p. 578), if we consider a
large population in which at least one “crazy” agent defects with positive probability in all rounds regardless
of the observed signal, then Kandori’s and Ellison’s equilibria fail because agents assign high probability to
the event that the contagion process has already begun, even after having experienced a long period during
which no partner defected against them. Recently, Dilmé (2016) presented a novel “tit-for-tat”-like contagious
equilibrium that is robust to the presence of committed agents, but only for the borderline case of g = l (as
discussed in Remark 7 below).
Sugden (1986) and Kandori (1992, Theorem 2) show that cooperation can be a perfect equilibrium in a
setup in which each player observes a binary signal about his partner, either a “good label” or a “bad label.”
All players start with a good label. This label becomes bad if a player defects against a “good” partner. The
equilibrium strategy that supports full cooperation in this setup is to cooperate against good partners and
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defect against bad partners. Theorems 1 and 6 reveal that the presence of a small fraction of committed agents
does not allow the population to maintain such a simple binary reputation under an observation structure
in which players observe an arbitrary number of past actions taken by their partners. The theorem shows
this indirectly, because if it were possible to derive binary reputations from this information structure, then it
should have been possible to support cooperation as a perfect equilibrium action. Moreover, Theorem 4 shows
that cooperation is not a perfect equilibrium action in acute games when players observe action profiles. This
suggests that the presence of a few committed agents does not allow us to maintain the seemingly simple binary
reputation mechanisms of Sugden (1986) and Kandori (1992), even under observation structures in which each
agent observes the whole action profile of many of her opponent’s past interactions.
The mild restriction to a regular perfect equilibrium is necessary for Theorem 1 to go through. Example
5 in Appendix G demonstrates the existence of a non-regular perfect equilibrium of an offensive PD, in which
players cooperate with positive probability. This non-robust equilibrium is similar to the “belief-free” sequential
equilibria that support cooperation in offensive Prisoner’s Dilemma games in Takahashi (2010), which have the
property that players are always indifferent between their actions, but they choose different mixed actions
depending on the signal they obtain about the partner.
4.3 Stability of Cooperation in Defensive Prisoner’s Dilemmas
Our next result shows that if players observe at least two actions, then cooperation is a regular perfect equi-
librium action in any defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma. Moreover, it shows that there is essentially a unique
combination of strategies that supports full cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, according to which:
(a) all agents cooperate when observing no defections, (b) all agents defect when observing at least 2 defections,
(3) sometimes (but not always) agents defect when observing a single defection.
Theorem 2. Let E = (GPD, k) be an environment with observations of actions, where GPD is a defensive
Prisoner’s Dilemma (g < l), and k ≥ 2.
1. If (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ 0) is a perfect equilibrium then: (a) for each s ∈ S∗, s0 (c) = 1 and sm (d) = 1 for each
m ≥ 2; and (b) there exist s, s′ ∈ S∗ such that s1 (d) < 1 and s′1 (d) > 0.
2. Cooperation is a regular perfect equilibrium action.
Sketch of Proof. Suppose that (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ 0) is a perfect equilibrium. The fact that the equilibrium induces
full cooperation, in the limit when the mass of commitment strategies converges to zero, implies that all normal
agents must cooperate when they observe no defections, i.e., s0 (c) = 1 for each s ∈ S∗.
Next we show that there is a normal strategy that induces the agent to defect with positive probability when
observing a single defection, i.e., s1 (d) > 0 for some s ∈ S∗. Assume to the contrary that s1 (c) = 1 for each
s ∈ S∗. If an agent (Alice) deviates and defects with small probability  << 1 when observing no defections,
then she outperforms the incumbents. On the one hand, the fact that she occasionally defects when observing
m = 0 gives her a direct gain of at least  · g. On the other hand, the probability that a partner observes
her defecting twice or more is O
(
2
)
; therefore her indirect loss from these additional  defections is at most
O
(
2
) · (1 + l), and therefore for a sufficiently small  > 0, Alice strictly outperforms the incumbents.
The fact that s1 (d) > 0 for some s ∈ S∗ implies that defection is a best reply conditional on an agent
observing m = 1. The direct gain from defecting is strictly increasing in the probability that the partner defects
(because the game is defensive), while the indirect influence of defection on the behavior of future partners is
independent of the partner’s play. This implies that defection must be the unique best reply when an agent
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observes m ≥ 2 , since such an observation implies a higher probability that the partner is going to defect
relative to the observation of a single defection. This establishes that sm (d) = 1 for all m ≥ 2 and all s ∈ S∗.
In order to demonstrate that there is a strategy s such that s1 (d) < 1, assume to the contrary that s1 (d) = 1
for each s ∈ S∗. Suppose that the average probability of defection in the population is 0 < Pr (d). Since there is
full cooperation in the limit we have Pr (d) = O (). This implies that a random partner is observed to defect at
least once with a probability of k·Pr (d)+O (2). This in turn induces the defection of a fraction k·Pr (d)+O (2)
of the normal agents (under the assumption that s1 (d) = 1). Since the normal agents constitute a fraction
1 − O () of the population we must have Pr (d) = k · Pr (d) + O (2), which leads to a contradiction for any
k ≥ 2. Thus, if s1 (d) = 1, then defections are “contagious,” and so there is no steady state in which only a
fraction O () of the population defects. This completes the sketch of the proof of part 1.
To prove part 2 of the theorem, let s1 and s2 be the strategies that defect iff m ≥ 1 and m ≥ 2, respectively.
Consider the state
({
s1, s2
}
, (q∗, 1− q∗) , θ∗ ≡ 0). The direct gain from defecting (relative to cooperating) when
observing a single defection is
Pr (m = 1) · ((l · Pr (d|m = 1)) + g · Pr (c|m = 1)) ,
where Pr (d|m = 1) (Pr (c|m = 1)) is the probability that a random partner is going to defect (cooperate)
conditional on the agent observing m = 1, and Pr (m = 1) is the average probability of observing signal m = 1.
The indirect loss from defection, relative to cooperation, conditional on the agent observing a single defection,
is
q∗ · (k · Pr (m = 1)) · (l + 1) +O
(
(Pr (m = 1))2
)
.
To see this, note that a random partner defects with an average probability of q if he observes a single defection
(which occurs with probability k · Pr (m = 1) when the partner makes k i.i.d. observations, each of which has
a probability of Pr (m = 1) of being a defection), and each defection induces a loss of l + 1 to the agent (who
obtains −l instead of 1). The fact that some normal agents cooperate and others defect when observing a
single defection implies that in an equilibrium both actions have to be best replies conditional on the agent
observing m = 1. This implies that the indirect loss from defecting is exactly equal to the direct gain (up to
O
(
(Pr (m = 1))2
)
), i.e.,
Pr (m = 1) · ((l · Pr (d|m = 1)) + g · Pr (c|m = 1)) = q∗ · (k · Pr (m = 1)) · (l + 1)
⇒ q∗ = (l · Pr (d|m = 1)) + g · Pr (c|m = 1)
k · (l + 1) . (5)
The probability Pr (d|m = 1) depends on the distribution of commitments. Yet, one can show that for every
distribution of commitment strategies
(
SC , λ
)
, there is a unique value of q∗ ∈ (0, 1k) that solves Eq. (5) and
that, given this q∗, both s1 and s2 (and only these strategies) are best replies. This means that the steady state({
s1, s2
}
, (q∗, 1− q∗) , θ∗ ≡ 0) is a perfect equilibrium.
Discussion of Theorem 2 We comment on a few issues related to Theorem 2.
1. In the formal proof of Theorem 2 we show that cooperation satisfies the stronger refinements of strict
perfection, evolutionary stability, and robustness (see Section 3.3 and Appendix D).
2. Each distribution of commitment strategies induces a unique frequency q∗ ∈ (0, 1k) of s1-agents, which
yields a perfect equilibrium. One may wonder whether a population starting from a different share q0 6= q∗
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of s1-agents is likely to converge to the equilibrium frequency q∗. It is possible to show that the answer
is affirmative. Specifically, given any initial low frequency q0 ∈ (0, q∗), the s1-agents achieve a higher
payoff than the s2-agents and, given any initial high frequency q0 ∈
(
q∗, 1k
)
, the s1-agents achieve a lower
payoff than the s2-agents. Thus, under any smooth monotonic dynamic process in which a more successful
strategy gradually becomes more frequent, the share of s1-agents will shift from any initial value in the
interval q0 ∈
(
0, 1k
)
to the exact value of q∗ that induces a perfect equilibrium.
3. As discussed in the formal proof in Appendix E.3, some distributions of commitment strategies may induce
a slightly different perfect equilibrium, in which the population is homogeneous, and each agent in the
population defects with probability q∗ (µ) when observing a single defection (contrary to the heterogeneous
deterministic behavior described above).
4. Random number of observed actions. Consider a random environment (GPD, p), where p ∈ ∆ (N) is
a distribution with a finite support, and each agent privately observes k actions of the partner with
probability p (k). Theorem 2 (and, similarly, Theorems 3–5) can be extended to this setup for any
random environment in which the probability of observing at least two interactions is sufficiently high.
The perfect equilibrium has to be adapted as follows. As in the main model, all normal agents cooperate
(defect) when observing no (at least two) defections. In addition, there will be a value k¯ ∈ supp (p) and a
probability q ∈ [0, 1] (which depend on the distribution of commitment strategies), such that all normal
agents cooperate (defect) when observing a single defection out of k > k¯ (k < k¯), and a fraction q of the
normal agents defect when observing a single defection out of k¯ observations.
5. Cheap talk. In Appendix F we discuss the influence on Theorems 1–2 of the introduction of pre-play
(slightly costly) cheap-talk communication. In this setup one can show that:
(a) Offensive games: No stable state exists. Both defection and cooperation are only “quasi-stable””
the population state occasionally changes between theses two states, based on the occurrence of rare
random experimentations. The argument is adapted from Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001).
(b) Defensive games (and k ≥ 2): The introduction of cheap talk destabilizes all inefficient equilibria,
leaving cooperation as the unique stable outcome. The argument is adapted from Robson (1990).
6. General Noise Structures: In the model described above we deal with perturbed environments that include
a single kind of noise, namely, committed agents who follow commitment strategies. It is possible to
extend our results to include additional sources of noise: specifically, observation noise and/or trembles.
We redefine a perturbed environment as a tuple E,δ =
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, α, , δ
)
, where (G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
are defined as in the main model, 0 < δ << 1 is the probability of error in each observed action of a player,
and α ∈ ∆ (A) is a totally mixed distribution according to which the observed error is sampled from in
the event of an observation error. Alternatively, these errors can also be interpreted as actions played by
mistake by the partner due to trembling hands. One can show that all of our results can be adapted to
this setup in a relatively straightforward way. In particular, our results hold also in environments in which
most of the noise is due to observation errors, provided that there is a small positive share of committed
agents (possibly much smaller than the probability of an observation error).
7. The borderline case between defensiveness and offensiveness: g = l. Such a Prisoner’s Dilemma can be
interpreted as a game in which each of the players simultaneously decides whether to sacrifice a personal
payoff of g in order to induce a gain of 1 + g to her partner. One can show that cooperation is also
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a perfect equilibrium action in this setup, and that it can be supported by the same kind of perfect
equilibrium as described above. However, in this case the uniqueness result (part 1 of Theorem 2) is no
longer true. The reason for this is that when g = l an agent has the same incentive to defect regardless
of the signal she observes about the partner (because the direct bonus of defection is equal to g = l
regardless of the partner’s behavior). This implies that cooperation can be supported by a large variety
of strategies (including belief-free-like strategies as in Takahashi, 2010; Dilmé, 2016). We note that none
of these strategies satisfy the refinement of evolutionary stability (Appendix D). One can adapt the proof
of Theorem 1 to show that defection is the unique evolutionarily stable outcome when g = l.
The following example demonstrates the existence of a perfect equilibrium that supports cooperation when the
unique commitment strategy is to play each action uniformly.
Example 2 (Example 1 revisited: illustration of the perfect equilibrium that supports cooperation). Consider
the perturbed environment (GD, 2, {su ≡ 0.5} , ), where GD is the defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma game with the
parameters g = 1 and l = 3 (as presented in Table 2 above). Consider the steady state
({
s1, s2
}
,
( 1
6 ,
5
6
)
, θ∗
)
,
where θ∗ is defined as in (3) in Example 1 above. A straightforward calculation shows that the average
probability in which a normal agent observes m = 1 when being matched with a random partner is
Pr (m = 1) =  · 0.5 + 3.5 ·  · 16 + 0.5 ·  ·
5
6 +O
(
2
)
= 1.5 · +O (2) .
The probability that the partner is a committed agent conditional on observing a single defection is:
Pr (su|m = 1) =  · 0.51.5 ·  =
1
3 ⇒ Pr (d|m = 1) =
1
3 · 0.5 =
1
6 ,
which yields the conditional probability that the partner of a normal agent will defect. Next we calculate the
direct gain from defecting conditional on the agent observing a single defection (m = 1):
Pr (m = 1) · ((l · Pr (d|m = 1)) + g · Pr (c|m = 1)) = 1.5 ·  ·
(
3 · 16 + 1 ·
5
6
)
+O
(
2
)
= 2 · +O (2) .
The indirect loss from defecting conditional on the agent observing a single defection is:
q · (k · Pr (m = 1)) · (l + 1) +O (2) = q · 2 · 1.5 ·  · (3 + 1) = 12 · q · +O (2) .
When taking q = 16 the indirect loss from defecting is exactly equal to the direct gain (up to O
(
2
)
).
Stability of Cooperation when Observing a Single Action We conclude this section by showing that
in defensive Prisoner’s Dilemmas with k = 1, cooperation is a regular perfect equilibrium action iff g < 1.
Proposition 2. Let E = (GPD, 1) be an environment where GPD is a defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma (g < l).
Cooperation is a (regular) perfect equilibrium action iff g < 1.
Sketch of Proof. Similar arguments to those presented in part 1 of Theorem 2 imply that any distribution of
commitment strategies induces a unique average probability q by which normal agents defect when observing
m = 1, in any cooperative perfect equilibrium. This implies that a deviator who always defects gets a payoff of
1 + g in a fraction 1− q of the interactions. One can show that such a deviator outperforms the incumbents if9
9In environments with k ≥ 2, a deviator who always defects gets a payoff of zero, regardless of the value of q (because all agents
observe m = k when being matched with such a deviator).
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g > 1 (whereas, if g < 1, there are distributions of commitment for which 1− q is sufficiently low such that the
deviator is outperformed).
Proposition 2 is immediately implied by Proposition 4 (Appendix C.5), which characterizes which distribu-
tions of commitments support cooperation as a perfect equilibrium outcome in a defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma
when k = 1.
5 General Observation Structures
In this section we extend our analysis to general observation structures in which the signal about the partner
may also depend on the behavior of other opponents against the partner.
5.1 Definitions
An observation structure is a tuple Θ = (k,B, o), where k ∈ N is the number of observed interactions, B ={
b1, .., b|B|
}
is a finite set of observations that can be made in each interaction, and the mapping o : A×A→ B
describes the observed signal as a function the action profile played in the interaction (where the first action
is the one played by the current partner, and the second action is the one played by his opponent). Note that
observing actions (which was analyzed in the previous section) is equivalent to having B = A and o (a, a′) = a.
In the results of this section we focus on three observation structures:
1. Observation of action profiles: B = A2 and o (a, a′) = (a, a′) . In this observation structure, each agent
observes, in each sampled interaction of her partner, both the action played by her partner and the action
played by her partner’s opponent.
2. Observation of conflicts: observing whether or not there was mutual cooperation. That is, B = {C,D},
o (c, c) = C, and o (a, a′) = D for any (a, a′) 6= (c, c). Such an observation structure (which we have not
seen in the existing literature) seems like a plausible way to capture non-verifiable feedback about the
partner’s behavior. The agent can observe, in each sampled past interaction of the partner, whether both
partners were “happy” (i.e., mutual cooperation) or whether the partners complained about each other
(i.e., there was a conflict, at least one of the players defected, and it is too costly for an outside observer
to verify who actually defected).
3. Observation of actions against cooperation: B = {CC,DC, ∗D} and o (c, c) = CC, o (d, c) = DC, and
o (c, d) = o (d, d) = ∗D. That is, each agent (Alice) observes a ternary signal about each sampled
interaction of her partner (Bob): either both players cooperated, or Bob unilaterally defected, or Bob’s
partner defected (and in this latter case Alice cannot observe Bob’s action). We analyze this observation
structure because it turns out to be an “optimal” observation structure that allows cooperation to be
supported as a perfect equilibrium action in any Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In each of these cases, we let the mapping o and the set of signals B be implied by the context, and identify
the observation structure Θ with the number of observed interactions k.
In what follows we present the definitions of the main model (Sections 2 and 3) that have to be changed
to deal with the general observation structure. Before playing the game, each player independently samples k
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independent interactions of her partner. Let M denote the set of feasible signals:
M =
{
m ∈ N|B|
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
mi = k
}
,
where mi is interpreted as the number of times that observation bi has been observed in the sample. When
agents observe conflicts, we simplify the notation by letting M = {1, ..., k}, and interpreting m ∈ {1, ..., k} as
the number of observed conflicts.
The definitions of a strategy and a perturbed environment remain the same. Given a distribution of action
profiles ψ ∈ ∆ (A×A), let νψ = ν (ψ) ∈ ∆ (M) be the multinomial distribution of signals that is induced by
the distribution of action profiles ψ, i.e.,
νψ
(
m1, ...,m|B|
)
= k!
m1! · ... ·m|B|! ·
|B|∏
i=1
 ∑
{(a,a′)∈A×A|o(a,a′)=bi}
ψ (a, a′)
mi .
The definition of a steady state is adapted as follows.
Definition 6 (Adaptation of Def. 6). A steady state (or state) of a perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
is
a triple
(
SN , σ, θ
)
, where SN ⊆ S is a finite set of strategies, σ ∈ ∆ (SN) is a distribution, and θ : (SN ∪ SC)→
∆ (M) is a profile of signal distributions that satisfies for each signal m and each strategy s the consistency
requirement (7) below. Let ψs ∈ ∆ (A×A) be the (possibly correlated) distribution of action profiles that is
played when an agent with strategy s ∈ SN ∪ SC is matched with a random partner (given σ and θ); i.e., for
each (a, a′) ∈ A× A, where a is interpreted as the action of the agent with strategy s, and a′ is interpreted as
the action of her partner, let
ψs (a, a′) =
∑
s′∈SN∪SC
((1− ) · σ (s′) +  · λ (s′)) · s (θs′) (a) · s′ (θs) (a′) . (6)
The consistency requirement that the mapping θ has to satisfy is
∀m ∈M, s ∈ SN ∪ SC , θs (m) = ν (ψs) (m) . (7)
The definition of the long-run payoff of an incumbent agent remains unchanged. We now adapt the definition
of the payoff of an agent (Alice) who deviates and plays a non-incumbent strategy. Unlike in the basic model,
in this extension there might be multiple consistent outcomes following Alice’s deviation, as demonstrated in
Example 3.
Example 3. Consider an unperturbed environment (GPD, 3) with an observation of k = 3 action profiles.
Consider a homogeneous incumbent population in which all agents play the following strategy: s∗ (m) = d if
m includes at least 2 interactions with (d, d) , and s∗ (m) = c otherwise. Consider the state ({s∗} , θ∗ = 0) in
which everyone cooperates. Consider a deviator (Alice) who follows the strategy of always defecting. Then
there exist three consistent post-deviation steady states (in all of which the incumbents continue to cooperate
among themselves): (1) all the incumbents defect against Alice, (2) all the incumbents cooperate against Alice,
and (3) all the incumbents defect against Alice with a probability of 50%.
Formally, we define a consistent distribution of signals for a deviator as follows.
Definition 7. Given steady state
(
SN , σ, θ
)
and non-incumbent strategy sˆ ∈ S\ (SN ∪ SC), we say that a
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distribution of signals θsˆ ∈ ∆ (M) is consistent if
∀m ∈M, θsˆ (m) = ν (ψsˆ) (m) ,
where ψs ∈ ∆ (A×A) is defined as in (6) above. Let Θsˆ ⊆ ∆ (M) be the set of all consistent signal distributions
of strategy sˆ.
Given steady state (S, σ, θ), non-incumbent strategy sˆ ∈ S\ (SN ∪ SC), and consistent signal distribution
θ (s) ≡ θsˆ ∈ ∆ (M), let pisˆ (S, σ, θ|θsˆ) denote the deviator’s (long-run) payoff given that in the post-deviation
steady state the deviator’s distribution of signals is θsˆ. Formally:
pisˆ (S, σ, θ|θsˆ) =
∑
s′∈SN∪SC
((1− ) · σ (s′) +  · λ (s′)) ·
 ∑
(a,a′)∈A×A
sˆθ(s′) (a) · s′θ(sˆ) (a′) · pi (a, a′)
 .
Let pisˆ (S, σ, θ) be the maximal (long-run) payoff for a deviator who follows strategy sˆ in a post-deviation
steady state:
pisˆ (S, σ, θ) :=θsˆ∈Θsˆ max pisˆ (S, σ, θ|θsˆ) . (8)
Remark 2. Our results remain the same if one replaces the maximum function in (8) with a minimum function.
5.2 Acute and Mild Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this subsection we present a novel classification of Prisoner’s Dilemma games that plays an important role in
the results of this section. Recall that the parameter g of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game may take any value in the
interval [0, l + 1] (if g > l + 1, then mutual cooperation is no longer the efficient outcome that maximizes the
sum of payoffs). We say that a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is acute if g is in the upper half of this interval (i.e., if
g > l+12 ), and mild if it’s in the lower half (i.e., if g <
l+1
2 ). The threshold, g =
l+1
2 , is characterized by the fact
that the gain from a single unilateral defection is exactly half the loss incurred by the partner who is the sole
cooperator. Hence, unilateral defection is mildly tempting in mild games and acutely tempting in acute games.
An interpretation of this threshold comes from a setup (which will be important for our results) in which an
agent is deterred from unilaterally defecting because it induces future partners to unilaterally defect against the
agent with some probability. Deterrence in acute games requires this probability of being punished to be more
than 50%, while a probability of below 50% is enough for mild games. Figure 1 illustrates the classification of
games into offensive/defensive and mild/acute.
Example 4. Table 3 demonstrates the payoffs of specific acute (GA) and mild (GM ) Prisoner’s Dilemma
games. In both examples g = l, i.e., the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is “linear.” This means that it can be
described as a “helping game” in which agents have to decide simultaneously whether to give up a payoff of g
in order to create a benefit of 1 + g for the partner. In the acute game (GA) on the left, g = 3 and the loss of a
helping player amounts to more than half of of the benefit to the partner who receives the help ( 33+1 =
3
4 >
1
2 ),
while in the mild game (GM ) on the right, g = 0.2 and the loss of the helping player is less than half of the
benefit to the partner who receives the help ( 0.20.2+1 =
1
6 <
1
2 ).
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Figure 1: Classification of Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
Table 3: Matrix Payoffs of Acute and Mild Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
c d
c 1
1 −l 1+g
d 1+g
−l
0
0
General Prisoner’s Dilemma
GPD: g, l > 0 , g < l + 1
c d
c 1
1 −3 4
d 4
−3
0
0
Ex. 3: Acute Prisoner’s Dilemma
GA: g = l = 3 > l+12 = 2
c d
c 1
1 −0.2 1.2
d 1.2
−0.2
0
0
Ex. 4: Mild Prisoner’s Dilemma
GM : g = l = 0.2 < l+12 = 0.6
5.3 Analysis of the Stability of Cooperation
We first note that Proposition 1 is valid also in this extended setup, with minor adaptations to the proof. Thus,
always defecting is a perfect equilibrium regardless of the observation structure. Next we analyze the stability
of cooperation in each of the three interesting observation structures.
The following two results show that under either observation of conflicts or observation of action
profiles, cooperation is a perfect equilibrium iff the Prisoner’s Dilemma is mild. Moreover, in mild Prisoner’s
Dilemma games there is essentially a unique strategy distribution that supports cooperation (which is analogous
to the essentially unique strategy distribution in Theorem 2). Formally:
Theorem 3. Let E = (GPD, k) be an environment with observation of conflicts with k ≥ 2.
1. If GPD is a mild PD (g < l+12 ), then:
(a) If (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ 0) is a perfect equilibrium then (1) for each s ∈ S∗, s0 (c) = 1 and sm (d) = 1 for
each m ≥ 2, and (2) there exist s, s′ ∈ S∗ such that s1 (d) < 1 and s′1 (d) > 0.
(b) Cooperation is a regular perfect equilibrium action.
2. If GPD is an acute PD (g > l+12 ), then cooperation is not a perfect equilibrium action.
Sketch of proof. The argument for part 1(a) is analogous to Theorem 2. In what follows we sketch the proofs
of part 1(b) and part 2. Fix a distribution of commitments, and a commitment level  ∈ (0, 1). Let m denote
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the number of observed conflicts and define s1 and s2 as before, but with the new meaning of m. Consider
the following candidate for a perfect equilibrium
({
s1, s2
}
, (q, 1− q) , θ∗ ≡ 0). Here, the probability q will be
determined such that both actions are best replies when an agent observes a single conflict. That is, the direct
benefit from her defecting when observing m = 1 (the LHS of the equation below) must balance the indirect
loss due to inducing future partners who observe these conflicts to defect (the RHS, neglecting terms of O ()).
The RHS is calculated by noting that defection induces an additional conflict only if the current partner has
cooperated and that, on expectation, each such additional conflict is observed by k future partners, each of
whom defects with an average probability of q). Recall that Pr (d|m = 1) (Pr (c|m = 1)) is the probability that
a random partner is going to defect (cooperate) conditional on the agent observing m = 1.
Pr (m = 1) · ((l · Pr (d|m = 1)) + g · Pr (c|m = 1)) = Pr (m = 1) · k · q · Pr (c|m = 1) · (l + 1)
⇔ q · k = (l · Pr (d|m = 1)) + g · Pr (c|m = 1)Pr (c|m = 1) · (l + 1) . (9)
One can see that the RHS is increasing in Pr (d|m = 1). The minimal bound on the value of q is obtained when
Pr (d|m = 1) = 0. In this case q · k = gl+1 .
Suppose that the game is acute. In this case q · k > 0.5. Suppose that the average probability of defection
in the population is Pr (d). Since there is full cooperation in the limit we have Pr (d) = O (). This implies that
a fraction 2 · Pr (d) + O (2) of the population is involved in conflicts. This in turn induces the defection of a
fraction 2 · Pr (d) · k · q +O (2) of the normal agents (because a normal agent defects with probability q upon
observing at least one conflict in the k sampled interactions). Since the normal agents constitute a fraction
1−O () of the population we must have Pr (d) = 2 ·Pr (d) ·k ·q+O (2). However, in an acute game, 2 ·k ·q > 1
leads to the contradiction that Pr (d) < Pr (d). Thus, if 2 ·k · q > 1, then defections are contagious, and so there
is no steady state in which only a fraction O () of the population defects.
Suppose that the game is mild. One can show that Pr (d|m = 1) is decreasing in q, and that it converges to
zero when k · q ↗ 0.5. (The reason is that when k · q is close to 0.5 each defection by a committed agent induces
many defections by normal agents and, conditional on observing m = 1, the partner is likely to be normal and
to cooperate when being matched with a normal agent.) It follows that the RHS of Eq. (9) is decreasing in
q and approaches the value gl+1 when k · q ↗ 0.5. Since the game is mild, gl+1 < 0.5. Hence there is some
q · k < 0.5 that solves Eq. (9), and in which the normal agents defect with a low probability of (O ()).
Theorem 4. Let E = (GPD, k) be an environment with observation of action profiles and k ≥ 2.
1. If GPD is a mild PD (g < l+12 ), then cooperation is a regular perfect equilibrium action.
2. If GPD is an acute PD (g > l+12 ), then cooperation is not a perfect equilibrium action.
Sketch of proof. Using arguments that are familiar from above one can show that in any perfect equilibrium that
supports cooperation, normal agents have to defect with an average probability of q ∈ (0, 1) when observing
a single unilateral defection (and k − 1 mutual cooperations), and defect with a smaller probability when
observing a single mutual defection (since this is necessary in order for a normal agent to have better incentives
to cooperate against a partner who is more likely to cooperate). The value of q is determined by Eq. (9)
above, implying that both actions are best replies conditional on an agent observing the partner to be the sole
defector once, and to be involved in mutual cooperation in the remaining k − 1 observed action profiles. Let
 be the share of committed agents, and let ϕ be the average probability that a committed agent unilaterally
defects. In order to simplify the sketch of the proof, we will focus on the case in which the committed agents
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defect with a small probability when observing the partner to have been involved only in mutual cooperations,
which implies, in particular, that ϕ << 1 (the formal proof in the Appendix does not make this simplifying
assumption). The unilateral defections of the committed agents induce a fraction  · ϕ · k · q +O (2)+O (ϕ2)
of the normal agents to defect when being matched against committed agents (because a normal agent defects
with probability q upon observing a single unilateral defection in the k sampled interactions). These unilateral
defections of normal agents against committed agents induce a further ( · ϕ · k · q) · k · q + O (2) defections
of normal agents against other normal agents. Repeating this argument we come to the conclusion that the
average probability of a normal agent being the sole defector is (neglecting terms of O
(
2
)
and O
(
ϕ2
)
):
 · ϕ · k · q ·
(
1 + k · q + (k · q)2 + ...
)
=  · ϕ · k · q1− k · q.
As discussed above, in acute games, the value of k ·q must be larger than 0.5, which implies that k·q1−k·q > 1. This
implies that conditional on an agent observing the partner to be the sole defector once, the posterior probability
that the partner is normal is:
 · ϕ · k·q1−k·q
 · ϕ+  · ϕ · k·q1−k·q
=
k·q
1−k·q
1 + k·q1−k·q
> 0.5.
Thus, normal agents are more likely to unilaterally defect than committed agents. One can show that when
there is a mutual defection, it is most likely that at least one of the agents involved is committed. This implies
that the partner is more likely to defect when he is observed to be involved in mutual defection relative to being
observed to be the sole defector. This implies that defection is the unique best reply when observing a single
mutual defection, and this contradicts the assumption that normal agents cooperate with positive probability
when observing a single mutual defection. When the game is mild, a construction similar to the previous proofs
supports cooperation as a perfect equilibrium.
Our last result studies the observation of actions against cooperation, and it shows that cooperation is a
perfect equilibrium action in any underlying Prisoner’s Dilemma. Formally:
Theorem 5. Let E = (GPD, k) be an environment with observation of actions against cooperation and k ≥ 2.
Then cooperation is a regular perfect equilibrium action.
The intuition behind the proof is as follows. Not allowing Alice to observe Bob’s behavior when his past
opponent has defected helps to sustain cooperation because it implies that defecting against a defector does
not have any negative indirect effect (in any steady state) because it is never observed by future opponents.
This encourages agents to defect against partners who are more likely to defect, and allows cooperation to be
sustained regardless of the values of g and l.
Table 4 summarizes our analysis and shows the characterization of the conditions under which cooperation
can be sustained as a perfect equilibrium outcome in environments in which agents observe at least 2 actions.
6 Related Literature
In what follows we discuss related literature that was not discussed above. Related experimental literature is
discussed in Appendix B.
Models with Rare Committed Types Various papers have shown that when a patient long-run agent
(she) plays a repeated game against partners who can observe her entire history of play, and there is a small
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Table 4: Summary of Key Results: When Is Cooperation a Perfect Equilibrium Outcome?
Category of PD Parameters Observation Structure (any k ≥ 2)
Actions Conflicts Actionprofiles Actions againstcooperation
Mild & Defensive g < min
(
l, l+12
)
Y
Y Y
Y
Mild & Offensive l < g < l+12 N
Acute & Defensive l+12 < g < l Y
N N
Acute & Offensive max
(
l, l+12
)
< g N
probability of the agent being a commitment type, then the agent can guarantee herself a high payoff in any
equilibrium by mimicking an irrational type committed to Stackelberg-leader behavior (e.g., Kreps, Milgrom,
Roberts, and Wilson, 1982; Fudenberg and Levine, 1989; Celetani, Fudenberg, Levine, and Pesendorfer, 1996;
see Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, for a textbook analysis and survey). When both sides of the game are equally
patient, and, possibly, both sides have a small probability of being a commitment type, then the specific details
about the set of feasible commitment types, the underlying game, and the discount factor are important in
determining whether an agent can guarantee a high Stackelberg-leader payoff or whether a folk theorem result
holds and the set of equilibrium payoffs is the same as in the case of complete information (see, e.g., Cripps and
Thomas, 1995; Chan, 2000; Cripps, Dekel, and Pesendorfer, 2005; Hörner and Lovo, 2009; Atakan and Ekmekci,
2011; Pęski, 2014).
One contribution of our paper is to demonstrate that the introduction of a small probability that an agent
is committed may have qualitatively different implications in repeated games with random matching.10 In
defensive games, the presence of a few committed agents in the population implies that there is a unique
stationary strategy to sustain full cooperation. In offensive games with observation of actions, the presence of
committed agents implies that the low payoff of zero (of mutual defection) is the unique equilibrium payoff in
the stationary model (and it rules out the highest symmetric payoff of 1 in the conventional model). 11
Image Scoring In an influential paper, Nowak and Sigmund (1998) present the mechanism of image scoring
to support cooperation when agents from a large community are randomly matched and each agent observes
the partner’s past actions. In their setup, each agent observes the last k past actions of the partner, and she
defects if and only if the partner has defected at least m times in the last k observed actions. A couple of papers
have raised concerns about the stability of cooperation under image-scoring mechanisms. Specifically, Leimar
and Hammerstein (2001) demonstrate in simulations that cooperation is unstable, and Panchanathan and Boyd
(2003) analytically study the case in which each agent observes the last action.12 Our paper makes two key
contributions to this literature. First, we introduce a novel variant of image scoring that is essentially the unique
10We are aware of only one paper that introduces rare commitment types to repeated games with random matching. Dilmé
(2016) constructs cooperative “tit-for-tat”-like equilibria that are robust to the presence of committed agents, in the borderline
case in which g = l is the underlying Prisoner’s Dilemma (see the discussion of the case of g = l in Remark 7 in Section 4.3).
Ghosh and Ray (1996) study a somewhat related setup (which is further discussed below) in which the presence of a non-negligible
share of agents who are committed to always defecting allows cooperation to be sustained among the normal agents in voluntarily
separable interactions.
11Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine (2008) show a related result in a setup in which a long-run player faces a sequence of short-run
players. They show that if the participation of the short-run players is optional, and if every action of the long-run player that
makes the short-run players want to participate can be interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad,” then reputation
uniquely chooses a low equilibrium payoff to the long-run player.
12See Berger and Grüne (2016) who study observation of k actions, but restrict agents to play only image-scoring-like strategies.
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stationary way to support cooperation as a perfect equilibrium outcome when agents observe actions. Second,
we show that the classification of Prisoner’s Dilemma games into offensive and defensive games is critical to the
stability of cooperation when agents observe actions (and image scoring fails in offensive Prisoner’s Dilemma
games).
Structured Populations and Voluntarily Separable Interactions A few papers have studied the scope
of cooperation in the case where players do not have any information about their current partner but the
matching of agents is not uniformly random. That is, the population is assumed to have some structure such
that some agents are more likely to be matched to some partners than to other partners. van Veelen, García,
Rand, and Nowak (2012) and Alger and Weibull (2013) show that it is possible to sustain cooperation with
no information about the partner’s behavior if matching is sufficiently assortative, i.e., if cooperators are more
likely to interact with other cooperators. Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara (2009,
2017) show how to sustain cooperation in a related setup in which matching is random, but each pair of matched
agents may unanimously agree to keep interacting without being rematched to other agents.13 Our paper shows
that letting players observe the partner’s behavior in two interactions is sufficient to sustain cooperation without
assuming assortativity or repeated interactions with the same partner.
Models without Calendar Time. The present paper differs from most of the literature on community
enforcement by having a model without a global time zero. To the best of our knowledge, Rosenthal (1979) is
the first paper to present the notion of a steady-state Nash equilibrium in environments in which each player
observes the partner’s last action, and apply it to the study of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Rosenthal focuses only
on pure steady states (in which everyone uses the same pure strategy), and concludes that defection is the unique
pure stationary Nash equilibrium action except in a few knife-edge cases. The methodology is further developed
in Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995). Other papers following a related approach include Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1985), who study bargaining, and Phelan and Skrzypacz (2006) who study repeated games with
private monitoring. Our methodological contribution to the previous literature is that (1) we allow each agent
to observe the behavior of the partner in several past interactions with other opponents, and (2) we combine
the steady-state analysis with the presence of a few committed agents and present a novel notion of a perfect
equilibrium to analyze this setup.
7 Conclusion
In many situations people engage in short-term interactions where they are tempted to behave opportunistically
but there is a possibility that future partners will obtain some information about their behavior today. We
propose a new modeling approach based on the premises that (1) an equilibrium has to be robust to the presence
of a few committed agents, and (2) the community has been interacting from time immemorial (though this
latter assumption is relaxed in Appendix A).
We develop a novel methodology that allows for a tractable analysis of these seemingly complicated envi-
ronments. We apply this methodology to the study of Prisoner’s Dilemma games, and we obtain sharp testable
predictions for the equilibrium outcomes, and the exact conditions under which cooperation can be sustained
as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we show that whenever cooperation is sustainable, there is a unique (and
novel) way to support it that has a few appealing properties: (1) agents behave in an intuitive and simple way,
13See also Herold (2012) who studies a “haystack” model in which individuals interact within separate groups.
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and (2) the equilibrium is robust, e.g., to deviations by a group of agents, or to the presence of any kind of
committed agents. We believe that our modeling approach will be helpful in understanding various interactions
in future research.
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Online Appendices
A Conventional Repeated Game Model
The main model of the paper relies on various simplifying assumptions, and some unconventional modeling
choices that distinguish it from the existing literature: (1) the interactions within the community do not have
an explicit starting point, (2) agents live forever and do not discount the future, (3) agents are only allowed to
follow stationary strategies, (4) agents (privately) observe the partner’s actions sampled from the entire infinite
history of play of the partner. In this Appendix we present a conventional repeated game model that relaxes
all of these assumptions. It differs from most of the existing literature in only one respect: the presence of a
small fraction of committed agents in the population. We show that this difference is sufficient to yield most
of our key results. For brevity, we focus only on the observations of actions. The adaptation of the results on
general observation structures is analogous.
A.1 Adaptations to the Model
Environment as a Repeated Game We consider an infinite population (a continuum of mass one) inter-
acting in discrete time t = 0, 1, 2, 3, .... We redefine an environment to be a triple (G, k, δ), where G = (A, pi)
is the underlying symmetric game, k ∈ N is the number of recent actions of an agent that are observed by her
partner, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor of the agents. In each period the agents are randomly matched
into pairs and, before playing, each agent observes the most recent min (k, t) actions of her partner; i.e., an
agent observes all past actions in the early rounds when t ≤ k, and she observes only the last k rounds in later
rounds when t > k. Let M = ∪i≤kAi denote the set of all possible signals.
Remark 3. Our results can be adapted to a more general setup in which each agent observes k actions randomly
sampled from the partner’s last n ≥ k actions. The case of n >> k is the one closest to the main model. We
choose to focus on the opposite case of n = k (i.e., observation of the last k actions) in order to demonstrate
the robustness of our results in the setup that is the “furthest” from the main model.
A (private) history of an agent at round tˆ is a tuple htˆ =
(
(mt, at, bt)0≤t<tˆ ,mtˆ
)
, where mt ∈M is the signal
observed by the agent about her opponent at round t, at ∈ A is the action played by the agent at round t, and
bt ∈ A is the action played by the past partner at round t. Finally, mtˆ is the signal the agent has observed
about her current partner. Let Htˆ denote the set of all possible histories at round tˆ, and let H = ∪T∈NHT
denote the set of all (finite) histories.
A strategy is a mapping s : H → ∆ (A) assigning a mixed action to each (private) history. We redefine S
to denote the set of all such strategies. Note, that unlike in the main model we do not impose any restrictions
on the set of feasible strategies. In particular, we allow agents to follow non-stationary strategies. A strategy is
uniformly totally mixed if there exist γ > 0 such that for each history htˆ ∈ H and each action a ∈ A it is the
case that shtˆ (a) > γ.
Perturbed Environment and Population State A perturbed environment is a tuple consisting of: (1)
an environment, (2) a distribution λ over a set of commitment strategies SC that includes a uniformly totally
mixed strategy, and (3) a number  representing how many agents are committed to playing strategies in SC
(committed agents). The remaining 1−  agents can play any strategy in SN (normal agents). Formally:
Definition 8. A perturbed environment is a tuple E =
(
(G, k, δ) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
, where (G, k, δ) is an environment,
SC is a non-empty finite set of strategies (called commitment strategies) that includes a uniformly totally mixed
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strategy, λ ∈ ∆ (SC) is a distribution with full support over the commitment strategies, and  ≥ 0 is the mass
of committed agents in the population.
A population state is defined as a pair
(
SN , σ
)
, where SN is the finite set of normal strategies in the popu-
lation, and σ ∈ ∆ (SN) is the distribution describing the frequency of each normal strategy in the population
of normal agents. By standard arguments, a population state
(
SN , σ
)
and a perturbed environment E jointly
induce a unique sequence of distributions over the set of histories. Formally, there exists a unique profile
(µs,t)s∈S,t∈N, where each µs,t ∈ ∆ (HT ) is a distribution over the histories of length t, such that µs,t (ht) is the
probability that an agent who follows strategy s reaches history ht ∈ Ht in round t.
Expected Payoff and Equilibria In what follows we define the (ex-ante) expected payoff of an agent who
follows strategy s and has discount factor δ , given a population state
(
SN , σ
)
of a perturbed environment
E =
(
(G, k, δ) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
. When s ∈ SN ∪ SC is an incumbent strategy, we define the payoff as follows:
pis
(
SN , σ, E
)
= (1− δ) ·
∑
t≥1
δt−1 ·
∑
ht=((mt,at,bt)0≤t<tˆ,mtˆ)∈Ht
µs,t (ht) · pi (at−1, bt−1) . (10)
As in the stationary model, let pi
(
SN , σ, E
)
=
∑
s∈SN σ (s) · pis
(
SN , σ, E
)
denote the mean payoff of the
normal agents in the population.
Next consider an agent (Alice) who deviates and plays a new strategy sˆ ∈ S\SN . Alice’s strategy determines
her behavior against the incumbents. This determines the distribution of signals that are observed by the
partners when being matched with Alice, and thus it determines the incumbents’ play against Alice, and this
uniquely determines the sequence of distributions over the set of histories of Alice. Formally, there exists a
unique profile (µsˆ,t)t∈N, where each µsˆ,t ∈ ∆ (HT ) is a distribution over the histories of length t, such that
µsˆ,t (ht) is the probability that Alice who follows strategy sˆ reaches history ht ∈ Ht in round t. We define
Alice’s payoff pisˆ
(
SN , σ, E
)
in the same way as in Eq. (10), with µsˆ,t (ht) replacing µs,t (ht).
The definition of Nash equilibrium is standard:
Definition 9. A population state
(
SN , σ
)
of the perturbed environment
(
(G, k, δ) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
is a Nash equi-
librium if for each strategy s ∈ S, it is the case that pis
(
SN , σ, E
) ≤ pi (SN , σ, E).
Definition 10. Fix an environment (G, k, δ). A sequence of strategies (sn)n converges to strategy s (denoted
by (sn)n →n→∞ s) if for each round t ∈ N, each history ht ∈ Ht, and each action a, the sequence of probabilities
s (ht) (a) converges to s (ht) (a) . A sequence of population states
(
SNn, σn
)
n
converges to a population state(
SN , σ∗
)
if for each strategy s ∈ supp (σ∗) , there exists a sequence of sets of strategies (SNn )n such that: (1)∑
sn∈SNn σn (sn)→ σ∗ (s), and (2) for each sequence of elements of those sets (i.e., for each sequence of strategies
(sn)n such that sn ∈ SNn for each n), sn →n→∞ s .
A perfect equilibrium is defined as the limit of a converging sequence of Nash equilibria of a converging
sequence of perturbed environments. Formally:
Definition 11. A population state
(
SN , σ∗
)
of the environment (G, k, δ) is a perfect equilibrium if there exist a
distribution of commitments
(
SC , λ
)
and converging sequences
(
SNn , σn
)
n
→n→∞
(
SN , σ∗
)
and (n > 0)n →n→∞
0, such that for each n, the state
(
SNn , σn
)
is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed environment
(
(G, k, δ) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
.
If the underlying game is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, we say that the perfect equilibrium induces full cooperation
if limn→∞ pi
(
SNn , σ, En
)
= pi (c, c).
We say that cooperation is a perfect equilibrium outcome if there exists a perfect equilibrium that induces
full cooperation.
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A.2 Adaptation of Main Results
The following result adapts the main results of Section 4. Specifically, it shows that full cooperation is a perfect
equilibrium outcome iff the underlying Prisoner’s Dilemma game is (weakly) defensive. Moreover, we construct
a perfect equilibrium that sustains full cooperation and has the same qualitative properties as the strategy
presented in the stationary model. The intuition for the result is similar to the intuition described in connection
with the results of the stationary model.
Theorem 6. Let (GPD, k, δ) be an environment.
1. Cooperation is not a perfect equilibrium outcome if g > l.
2. Cooperation is a perfect equilibrium outcome if k ≥ 2, g ≤ l, and δ > ll+1 . Moreover, cooperation
is sustained by a strategy in which each normal agent (1) always cooperates if she observes the partner
always cooperating, (2) always defects if she observes the partner defecting at least twice, and (3) sometimes
defects if she observes the partner defecting once.
A.3 Discussion of the Results in the Setup of Repeated Games
Theorem 6 adapts our main results from the stationary model (Theorems 1 and 2) to the conventional setup of
repeated games.14 The adaptation weakens our main results in three aspects:
1. While Theorem 1 shows that no level of partial cooperation is sustainable in stationary environments,
Theorem 6 merely shows that full cooperation is not sustainable. The reason for this is as follows. In
stationary environments, if the partner has been observed to defect more often in the past, it implies that
he is more likely to defect in the current match. Such an inference is not always valid in a non-stationary
environment in which an agent may condition his behavior on his own recent history of play. In particular,
we conjecture that partial cooperation may be sustained in offensive games by a strategy according to
which normal agents sometimes cooperate, and an agent is more likely to cooperate if (1) the agent has
recently defected more often, and (2) if the partner has recently cooperated more often.
2. While Theorem 2 shows that there is essentially a unique way to support full cooperation, Theorem 6
shows only that a very similar mechanism can also be used to support full cooperation in standard repeated
games. The fact that we allow non-stationary strategies and that observed actions are ordered induces
a larger set of strategies, and does not allow us to show a similar uniqueness property in this setup. We
conjecture that some qualitative properties of the unique stationary equilibrium hold in any equilibrium
sustaining full cooperation: (1) normal agents always cooperate after observing no defections, (2) usually
(though not necessarily in all rounds) the average probability that a normal agent defects conditional on
observing a single defection of the partner is relatively low (less than 1k ), and (3) the average probability
that a normal agent defects conditional on observing many defections of the partner is relatively high.
3. Theorem 2 shows that cooperation is a strictly perfect equilibrium outcome; i.e., cooperation can be
sustained regardless of the behavior of the committed agents (as formally defined in Appendix D.1). In this
setup, as there is a much larger set of non-stationary strategies that may be used by committed agents, we
14Similarly, one can adapt Corollary 2 to the setup of repeated games, to show that when the underlying game is defensive
and each agent observes only the partner’s last action, there is a threshold g¯δ that depends on the discount factor δ, such that
cooperation can be supported as a perfect equilibrium outcome iff g < g¯δ, and this threshold converges to one as the discount factor
converges to one, i.e., limδ→1g¯δ = 1.
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are not able to show a similar strictness property. Specifically, we conjecture that full cooperation cannot
be sustained in a perturbed environment of an underlying defensive game in which each committed agent
defects with a high probability if he has defected at most once in the last k rounds, and he defects
with a low probability if he has defected at least twice in the last k rounds. This is so because in such
environments normal agents are incentivized to cooperate when observing the partner to defect in all
recent k rounds, but this implies that a deviator who always defects will outperform the incumbents.
Remark 4 (Comparison with Takahashi, 2010). The setup in this appendix is almost identical to the setup of
Takahashi (2010). The only key difference between the two models is that we introduce a few committed agents
into the population (in addition, Takahashi assumes that an agent observes all past actions of the partner,
but one can adapt his results to a setup in which an agent observes only the recent k actions of the partner).
Takahashi (2010, Prop. 2) constructs “belief-free” equilibria in which (1) each agent is indifferent between the
two actions after any history, and (2) each agent chooses actions independent of her own record of past play.
Takahashi shows how these equilibria can support any level of cooperation, and, in particular, can support full
cooperation in any Prisoner’s Dilemma.
We show that the presence of a few committed agents substantially changes this result when g 6= l . When
committed agents are present, an agent can no longer be indifferent between the two actions after all histories
of play, and can no longer play in the current match independently of her own record of past play.15 We adapt
Takahashi’s construction and present an equilibrium in which each agent is indifferent between the two actions
after only one class of histories: that in which the agent has cooperated in the previous k − 1 rounds and she
observes the partner to defect only in the last round. In all other classes of histories, the agents have strict
incentives to either cooperate or defect.
B Empirical Predictions and Experimental Verification
In this appendix we discuss a few testable empirical predictions of our model, comment on how to evaluate
these predictions in lab experiments, and discuss related experimental literature.
An experimental setup to evaluate our predictions would include a large group of subjects (say, at least 10)
who play a large number of rounds (say, in expectation at least 50 rounds), and are rematched in each period
to play a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a new partner. The experiment would include various treatments
that differ in terms of (1) the parameters of the underlying game, e.g., whether the game is offensive/defensive
and mild/acute, and (2) the information each agent observes about her partner: in particular, the number of
past interactions that each agent observes, and what she observes in each interaction (e.g., actions, conflicts, or
action profiles.)
Our theoretical predictions deal with a “pure” setup in which all agents maximize their material payoffs
except for a vanishingly small number of committed agents. An experimental setup (and, arguably, real-life
interactions) differs in at least two key respects: (1) agents, while caring about their material payoffs, may
consider other non-material aspects, such as fairness and reciprocity, and (2) agents occasionally make mistakes
and the frequency of these mistakes, while relatively low, is not negligible. In what follows, we describe our
key predictions in the “pure” setup, interpret its implications in a “noisy” experimental setup, and describe the
relevant existing data.
15Heller (2017) presents a related non-robustness argument in the setup of repeated games played by the same two players, and
shows that none of the belief-free equilibria are robust against small perturbations in the behavior of potential opponents (i.e., none
of them satisfy a mild refinement in the spirit of evolutionary stability).
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Our first prediction (Theorems 1 and 2) deals with observation of the partner’s actions, and it states that
cooperation can be sustained only in defensive games. In an experimental setup we interpret this to imply
that, ceteris paribus, the frequency of cooperation will be higher in a defensive game than in an offensive game.
Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009), Molleman, van den Broek, and Egas (2013), and Swakman, Molleman,
Ule, and Egas (2016) study the rate of cooperation in the borderline case of g = l and in the closely related
donor-recipient game, in which at each interaction only one of the players (the donor) chooses whether to give
up g of her own payoff to yield a gain of 1 + g for the recipient. The typical findings in these experiments
are that observation of 3–6 past actions induces a relatively high level of cooperation (50%–75%, where higher
rates of cooperation are typically associated with environments in which more past actions are observed, and
environments in which subjects can also observe second-order information about the behavior of the partner’s
past opponent). We are aware of only a single experiment that studies a setup in which g 6= l. Gong and Yang
(2014) study the case of g = 0.8 > l = 0.4, and present results that seem to be consistent with our prediction.
They observe an average rate of cooperation of only 30%–50%, even though in their setup players observe 10
past actions of the partner, and, in addition, are also able to observe the signal observed by the partner in
each of these past interactions (“second-order information,” which facilitates cooperation relative to the model
analyzed in this paper).
Our second prediction (Theorems 3 and 4) deals with observation of either past conflicts or past action
profiles, and it states that cooperation can be sustained only in mild games. In an experimental setup it implies
that, ceteris paribus, the frequency of cooperation will be higher in mild games than in acute games. We are
unaware of any existing experimental data with observation of either action profiles or conflicts.
It is interesting to compare our first two predictions to the comparative statics recently developed for repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma games played by the same pair of players. Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011), Dal Bó
and Fréchette (2011), and Breitmoser (2015) present theoretical arguments and experimental data to suggest
that when a pair of players repeatedly play the Prisoner’s Dilemma, then the lower the values of g and l are,
the easier it is to sustain cooperation.16 However, our prediction is that when agents are randomly matched in
each round, then the lower the value of g, and the higher the value of l, the easier it is to sustain cooperation.
Our final prediction is that when communities succeed in sustaining cooperation, it will be supported by
the following behavior: most subjects defect (resp., cooperate, mix) when observing 2+ (resp., 0, 1) defec-
tions/conflicts. In an experimental setup we interpret this to predict that the probability that an agent defects
increases with the number of times she observes the partner to be involved in defections/conflict. In particular,
we predict a substantial increase in a subject’s propensity to defect when moving from zero to two observations
of defection. The findings of Engelmann and Fischbacher (2009), Molleman, van den Broek, and Egas (2013),
Gong and Yang (2014), and Swakman, Molleman, Ule, and Egas (2016) suggest that subjects are indeed more
likely to defect when they observe the partner to defect more often in the past.
C Technical Definitions and Additional Results
The appendix presents technical definitions, which we have omitted from the model in Sections 2 and 3 for
expositional reasons. We also state simple results about the implementation of (“trembling-hand” perfect)
Nash equilibria as (perfect) Nash equilibria in our setup.
16Specifically, the above papers show that cooperation is more likely to be sustained in the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma if
the discount factor of the players is above g+l
g+l+1 . Note that this minimal threshold for cooperation is increasing in both parameters.
Embrey, Frechette, and Yuksel (2015) present similar comparative statics evidence for the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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C.1 Dynamic Mapping Between Signal Profiles
In this subsection we present a definition of a dynamic mapping between signal profiles, which is useful in the
definitions of the equilibrium refinements in Appendix D and in various proofs in Appendix E, and we prove a
simple result, namely, that any distribution of strategies admits a consistent signal profile.
Let fσ : OS → OS be the mapping between signal profiles that is induced by σ. That is, fσ (θ) is the “new”
signal profile that is induced by players who follow strategy distribution σ, and who observe signals about
the partners according to the “current” signal profile θ. Specifically, when Alice, who follows strategy s, is
being matched with a random partner whose strategy is sampled according to σ, she observes a random signal
according to the “current” average distribution of signals in the population θσ. As a result her distribution of
actions is s (θσ), and thus her behavior induces the signal distribution ν (s (θσ)). Thus, we define this latter
expression as her “new” distribution of signals (fσ (θ))s. Formally:
∀m ∈M, s ∈ S, (fσ (θ))s (m) = ν (s (θσ)) (m) . (11)
Observe that a signal profile θ : S → ∆ (M) is consistent with distribution of strategies σ (as defined in eq.
(2)) if it is a fixed point of the mapping fσ (θ), i.e., if fσ (θ) = θ. A standard fixed-point argument shows that
any distribution of strategies admits a consistent signal profile.
Lemma 1. Let S be a finite set of strategies and let σ ∈ ∆ (S) be a distribution. Then, there exists a consistent
signal profile θ : S → ∆ (M) such that (S, σ, θ) is a steady state.
Proof. Observe that the space OS is a convex and compact subset of a Euclidean space, and that the mapping
fσ : OS → OS (defined in (11) above) is continuous. Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem implies that the mapping
σ has a fixed point, which is a consistent outcome by definition.
C.2 Steady State in a Perturbed Environment
In this subsection we formally adapt the definitions of a consistent signal profile and of a steady state to
perturbed environments.
Let f((1−)·σ+·λ) : OS → OS be the mapping between signal profiles that is induced by the population’s
distribution over strategies ((1− ) · σ +  · λ). That is, f((1−)·σ+·λ) (θ) is the “new” signal profile that is
induced by a population of normal agents who follow strategy distribution σ and committed agents who follow
strategy distribution λ, and who observe signals about the partners according to the “current” signal profile
θ. Specifically, when Alice, who follows strategy s, is being matched with a random partner whose strategy
is sampled according to (1− ) · σ +  · λ, she observes a random signal according to the “current” average
distribution of signals in the population θ((1−)·σ+·λ). As a result her distribution of actions is s
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
)
,
and consequently her behavior induces the signal distribution ν
(
s
(
θ((1−)·σ+·λ)
))
. Thus, we define this latter
expression as her “new” distribution of signals
(
f((1−)·σ+·λ) (θ)
)
s
. Formally:
∀m ∈M, s ∈ S, (f((1−)·σ+·λ) (θ))s (m) = ν (s (θ((1−)·σ+·λ))) (m) . (12)
Given a distribution of strategies ((1− ) · σ +  · λ), we say that a signal profile θ∗ : SC ∪ SN → ∆ (M) is
consistent if it is a fixed point of the mapping f((1−)·σ+·λ), i.e., if f((1−)·σ+·λ) (θ∗) = θ∗.
We formally adapt the definition of a steady state as follows:
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Definition 12. A steady state (or state for short) of a perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
is a triple(
SN , σ, θ
)
where SN ⊆ S is a finite set of strategies (called, normal strategies), σ ∈ ∆ (SN) is a distribution
with a full support over SN , and θ : SN ∪ SC → ∆ (M) is a consistent signal profile.
C.3 Convergence of Strategies, Distributions, and States
Next we formally define the standard notions of convergence of strategies, convergence of distributions, and
convergence of states that are used throughout the paper.
Definition 13 (Convergence of strategies, of distributions, and of states). Fix environment (G, k). A sequence
of strategies (sn)n converges to strategy s (denoted by (sn)n →n→∞ s) if for each signal m ∈M and each action
a, the sequence of probabilities (sn)m (a) converges to sm (a) . A distribution of signals (νn)n converges to ν
(denoted by (νn)n →n→∞ ν) if the sequence of probabilities (νn) (m) converges to ν (m) for each signal m. A
sequence of states
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
n
converges to a state (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) if for each strategy s ∈ supp (σ∗) , there exists
a sequence of sets of strategies
(
SˆNn
)
n
, with SˆNn ⊆ SNn for each n, such that (1)
∑
sn∈SˆNn σn (sn)→ σ
∗ (s), and
for each sequence of elements of those sets (i.e., for each sequence of strategies (sn)n such that sn ∈ SˆNn for
each n), (2) sn →n→∞ s , and (3) θn (sn)→ θ∗ (s).
C.4 Implementing Nash and “Trembling-Hand” Perfect Equilibria
In what follows we show that any symmetric (“trembling-hand” perfect) Nash equilibrium α of the underlying
game corresponds to a (perfect) Nash equilibrium of the environment in which all normal agents play α regardless
of the observed signal.
The observation on Nash equilibria is immediate:
Fact 1. Let α ∈ ∆ (A) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy of the underlying game G = (A, pi). Then the
steady state
(
SN = {α} , α) in which everyone plays α regardless of the observed signal is a Nash equilibrium
in the unperturbed environment (G, k) for any k ∈ N.
In what follows we state and prove the result on perfect equilibria (note, that the result hold also for games
with more than two actions):
Proposition 3. Let α ∈ ∆ (A) be a symmetric perfect equilibrium action of the underlying game G = (A, pi).
Then the state (S = {α} , να) is a perfect equilibrium in the environment (G, k) for any k ∈ N. Moreover, if the
distribution α is not totally mixed, then
(
SN = {α} , να
)
is a regular perfect equilibrium.
Proof. If α is a totally mixed strategy, then it is immediate that the state ({α} , να) is a Nash equilibrium of
the perturbed environment((G, k) , {α} , ) for any  > 0, which implies that the state ({α} , να) is a perfect
equilibrium. Assume now that α is not totally mixed. The fact that α ∈ ∆ (A) is a symmetric perfect equilibrium
of the underlying game implies (see Selten, 1975, Theorem 7) that there is a sequence of totally mixed strategies
(αn)→n→∞ α, such that α is a best reply to each αn. The fact that α is a best reply both to itself and to α1
(the first element in the sequence (αn)) implies that the state ({α} , να) is a Nash equilibrium of the regular
perturbed environment ((G, k) , ({α1, α} , (0.5, 0.5)) , ) for any  > 0, which implies that ({α} , να) is a regular
perfect equilibrium.
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C.5 Stability of Cooperation when Observing a Single Action
In what follows we characterize which distributions of commitments support cooperation as a perfect equilibrium
outcome in a defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma when k = 1.
Given a distribution of commitments
(
SC , λ
)
, we define β(SC ,λ) ∈ (0, 1) as follows:
β(SC ,λ) =
Eλ
(
(s0 (d))2
)
Eλ ((s0 (d)))
=
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · (s0 (d))2∑
s∈SC λ (s) · s0 (d)
. (13)
The value of β(SC ,λ) is the ratio between the mean of the square of the probability of defection of a random
committed agent who observes m = 0 and the mean of the same probability without squaring it. In particular,
when the set of commitments is a singleton, β(SC ,λ) is equal to the probability that a committed agent defects
when she observes m = 0 (i.e., β(SC ,λ) = s0 (d)).
The following result shows that if the game is defensive and agents observe a single action, then cooperation
is a perfect equilibrium action with respect to the distribution of commitments
(
SC , λ
)
iff g ≤ β(SC ,λ).
Proposition 4. Let E = (GPD, 1) be an environment, where GPD is a defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma (g < l).
Let
(
SC , λ
)
be a distribution of commitments. There exists a regular perfect equilibrium (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ 0) with
respect to
(
SC , λ
)
iff g ≤ β(SC ,λ).
The proof of Prop. 4 is given in Appendix C.5. Observe that Prop. 4 immediately implies that cooperation
is a perfect equilibrium outcome in a defensive Prisoner’s Dilemma with k = 1 iff g < 1 (i.e., Proposition 4
implies Proposition 2).
D Stronger Equilibrium Refinements
In the main text we dealt with the notion of perfect equilibrium. In this appendix we present three stronger
refinements of this solution concept: strict perfection, evolutionary stability, and robustness.
D.1 Strictly Perfect Equilibrium Action
The notion of perfect equilibrium might be considered too weak because it may crucially depend on a specific
set of commitment strategies. In what follows we present the refinement of strict perfection that requires the
equilibrium outcome to be sustained regardless of which commitment strategies are present in the population.
In most of our results we focus on pure perfect equilibria in which there exists an action a∗ that is played with
probability one in the limit in which the frequency of committed agents converges to zero. In order to simplify
the notation, we define the refinement of strict perfection only with respect to pure equilibrium outcomes. We
say that an action a ∈ A is strictly perfect if it is the limit behavior of Nash equilibria with respect to all
distributions of commitment strategies. Formally:17
Definition 14. Action a∗ ∈ A is a strictly perfect equilibrium action in the environment E = (G, k) if, for
any distribution of commitment strategies
(
SC , λ
)
, there exist a steady state (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ νa∗) and converging
17Okada (1981) deals with normal-form games and presents the related notion of a strict perfect equilibrium as the limit of
Nash equilibria for any “trembling-hand” perturbation. In our setup different strategies might be equivalent in the sense that they
induce the same observable behavior, as the frequency of the commitment agents converges to zero. Our notion focuses on the
observed behavior (i.e., everyone playing action a∗), but allows for the choice of strategy that induces the pure action a∗ to depend
on the distribution of commitments. This approach is in the spirit of other set-wise solution concepts in the literature, such as
evolutionarily stable sets (Thomas, 1985) and hyperstable sets (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986).
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sequences
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
n
→n→∞ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) and (n > 0)n →n→∞ 0, such that for each n, the state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
.
Equilibrium actions that satisfy strict perfection The formal proofs of Proposition 1 show that defection
always satisfies the refinement of strict perfection. The formal proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 show that cooperation
satisfies the refinement of strict perfection when agents observe at least two actions in defensive games, or observe
at least two conflicts in mild games.
Equilibrium actions that do not satisfy strict perfection The proof of Proposition 4 shows that when
agents observe a single action, cooperation is a perfect equilibrium action only with respect to some distributions
of commitment strategies (namely, those in which the value of β(SC ,λ) is sufficiently large), and, thus, it is not
strictly perfect.
Cooperation is also not a strictly perfect equilibrium in Theorems 4 and 5 (dealing with observation of action
profiles and observation of actions against cooperation, respectively). Specifically, cooperation is not a perfect
equilibrium action with respect to distributions of commitments in which the committed agents defect with
high probability. The reason is that committed agents who defect with high probability induce normal partners
to defect against them with probability one. This implies that when observing a partner to be involved in either
side of a unilateral defection (either as the sole defector or as the sole cooperator), the partner is most likely to
be normal. As a result the agents’ incentives to defect are the same when observing mutual cooperation as when
observing unilateral defection, and this does not allow cooperation to be supported in a perfect equilibrium, as
such cooperation relies on agents who have better incentives to defect when observing a unilateral defection.
D.2 Evolutionary Stability
The notion of perfect equilibrium requires that no agent be able to achieve a better payoff than the incumbents
by unilateral deviation. In what follows we present the refinement of evolutionary stability, which requires
stability also against small groups of agents who deviate together.
D.2.1 Definitions
In a seminal paper, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) define a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy α∗ to be
evolutionarily stable if the incumbents achieve a strictly higher payoff when being matched with any other
best-reply strategy β (i.e., pi (β, α∗) = pi (α∗, α∗) ⇒pi (α∗, β) > pi (β, β). The motivation is that if β is a best
reply to α∗, then a single deviator who plays β will be as successful as the incumbents. This may induce a few
other agents to mimic her behavior, until a small positive mass of agents follow β. The above inequality implies
that at this stage the followers of β will be strictly outperformed, and thus will disappear from the population.
Our setup with environments is similar to the standard setup of a repeated game in that it rarely admits
evolutionarily stable strategies. Typically, not all the actions will be played by normal agents in equilibrium,
and as a result some signals will never be observed. Deviators who differ in their behavior only after such zero
probability signals will get the same payoff as the incumbents both against the incumbents and against other
deviators. This violates the above inequality.
Following Selten’s (1983) notion of “limit ESS,” (see also Heller, 2014) we solve this issue by requiring
evolutionary stability in a converging sequence of perturbed environments, in which all signals are observed on
the equilibrium path, instead of simply requiring evolutionary stability in the unperturbed environment.
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This is formalized as follows. Given a steady state (S, σ, θ) in a perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
,
we define pisˆ (sˆ) as the (long-run average) payoff of strategy sˆ against itself, and pi(S,σ) (sˆ) as the mean (long-run
average) payoff of the incumbents against strategy sˆ. Specifically, if sˆ ∈ S ∪ SC , then
pisˆ (sˆ|S, σ, θ) =
∑
(a,a′)∈A2
θˆsˆ (sˆ) (a) · θˆsˆ (sˆ) (a′) · pi (a, a′) ,
pi(S,σ) (sˆ|S, σ, θ) =
∑
s∈S∪SC
∑
(a,a′)∈A2
((1− ) · σ (s) +  · λ (s)) · θs (sˆ) (a) · θˆsˆ (s) (a′) · pi (a, a′) ,
and if sˆ /∈ S ∪ SC , then we define pisˆ (sˆ) and pi(S,σ) (sˆ) as the respective payoffs in the post-deviation steady
state
(
S ∪ {sˆ} , σˆ, θˆ
)
:
pisˆ (sˆ|S, σ, θ) =
∑
(a,a′)∈A2
θˆsˆ (sˆ) (a) · θˆsˆ (sˆ) (a′) · pi (a, a′) ,
pi(S,σ) (sˆ|S, σ, θ) =
∑
s∈S∪SC
∑
(a,a′)∈A2
((1− ) · σˆ (s) +  · λ (s)) · θˆs (sˆ) (a) · θˆsˆ (s) (a′) · pi (a, a′) .
Definition 15. A steady state (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) of a perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
is evolutionarily
stable if (1) (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) is a Nash equilibrium, and (2) for any best-reply strategy sˆ (i.e., pisˆ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) =
pi (S∗, σ∗, θ∗)), such that σ∗ (sˆ) < 1 (i.e., sˆ is not the only normal strategy) the following inequality holds:
pi(S,σ) (sˆ|S, σ, θ) > pisˆ (sˆ|S, σ, θ).
Definition 16. A steady state (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) of the environment (G, k) is a perfect evolutionarily stable state if
there exist a distribution of commitments
(
SC , λ
)
and converging sequences
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
n
→n→∞ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗)
and (n > 0)n →n→∞ 0, such that for each n, the state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
is an evolutionarily stable state in the
perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
. If the outcome assigns probability one to one of the actions, i.e.,
θ∗ ≡ a, then we say that this action is a perfect evolutionarily stable outcome.
Finally, we define a strictly perfect evolutionarily stable outcome as a pure action that is an outcome of a
perfect evolutionarily stable state for any distribution of commitments (similar to the notion of strict limit ESS
in Heller, 2015).
Definition 17. Action a∗ ∈ A is a strictly perfect evolutionarily stable outcome in the environment E =
((A, pi) , k) if, for any distribution of commitment strategies
(
SC , λ
)
, there exist a steady state (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ a∗)
and converging sequences
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
n
→n→∞ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) and (n > 0)n →n→∞ 0, such that for each n, the
state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
is an evolutionarily stable state in the perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
.
D.2.2 Adaptation of Results
All of our results hold with respect to the refinement of evolutionary stability. In particular, the fact that always
defecting is a strict equilibrium (i.e., the unique best reply to itself) in any slightly perturbed environment implies
that defection is a strictly perfect evolutionarily stable outcome.
One can adapt the results about sustaining cooperation as an equilibrium action (Theorems 2–5). Specif-
ically, minor modifications to the proofs can show that cooperation is a strictly perfect evolutionarily stable
outcome in defensive games with observation actions and in mild games with observation of conflicts (when
k ≥ 2), and that cooperation is a perfect evolutionarily stable outcome in mild games with observation of action
profiles, and in any game with observation of actions against defectors.
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A sketch of the argument why the results apply also to the refinement of evolutionary stability is as follows.
There are two kinds of steady states that sustain cooperation in the proofs in this paper:
1. Steady state ψ′n = ({sqn} , θn) that has a single normal strategy in its support. The arguments in the
proofs show that each such strategy is the unique best reply to itself in the nth perturbed environment
(i.e., pis′ (ψ′n) < pi (ψ′n) for each s′ 6= sqn), which shows that ψ′n is an evolutionarily stable state in the nth
perturbed environment.
2. Steady state ψn =
({
s1, s2
}
, (qn, 1− qn) , θn
)
that consists of two normal strategies in its support. The
arguments in the proofs show that these two strategies are the only best replies to this steady state (i.e.,
pis′ (ψn) < pi (ψnθn) for each s′ /∈
{
s1, s2
}
). Moreover, the arguments in the proof (see, in particular,
Remark 5 at the end of the proof of Theorem 2) imply that each of these two normal strategies obtains a
relatively low payoff when being matched against itself, i.e.,: pi
(
s1|ψn
)
> pis1
(
s1|S, σ, θ) and pi (s2|ψn) >
pis2
(
s2|ψn
)
, which implies that ψn is evolutionarily stable.
D.3 Robustness
The outcome of a perfect equilibrium may be unstable in the sense that small perturbations of the distribution
of observed signals may induce a change of behavior that moves the population away from the consistent signal
profile. We address this issue by introducing a robustness refinement (in the spirit of the notion of Lyapunov
stability in dynamic environments) that requires that if we slightly perturb the distribution of observed signals,
then the agents converge back to playing the equilibrium outcome.
In order to simplify the notation, we define the refinement of robustness only with respect to pure equilibrium
outcomes. We say that a pure perfect equilibrium with outcome a∗ is robust if there exists a bounded sequence
of parameters (κn)n such that for each perturbed environment with n committed agents: (1) the normal agents
play action a∗with a probability greater than 1− κn · n in the steady state, and (2) if one perturbs the initial
distribution of signals to any other (possibly inconsistent) signal profile in which the normal agents are observed
to play action a∗with a probability of at least 1−κn ·n, then agents continue to play action a∗ with a probability
of at least 1− κn · n in the new signal profile that is induced by the agents’ behavior and the perturbed signal
profile.
Let ∆bn (M) ⊆ ∆ (M) be the set of binomial distributions of signals that are induced by distributions of
actions, i.e.,
∆bn (M) = {ν˜ ∈ ∆ (M |∃α ∈ ∆ (A) s.t. ν˜ = ν (α))} ,
Let α (θs) ∈ ∆ (A) is the distribution of actions that induce signals distributed according to θs ∈ ∆bn (M), i.e.,
ν (α (θs)) = θs. Given a distribution of normal strategies
(
SN , σ
)
and a (possibly inconsistent) signal profile
θ, let ασ (θ) ∈ ∆ (A) be the (σ-weighted) population average of the distributions of actions that induce signals
distributed according to the signal profile θ ∈ ∆nm (M) for the normal agents; i.e., for each action a ∈ A,
ασ (θ) (a) =
∑
s∈SN
σ (s) · α (θs) (a) .
That is, (α (θs))s∈SN is the profile of distributions of actions that generate the profile of signal distributions for
the normal agents θ = {θs}s∈SN , and ασ (θ) is the (σ-weighted) average of the distributions of actions in this
profile.
The formal definition of robust perfection is as follows.
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Definition 18. Let (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ a∗) be a perfect equilibrium with respect to the distribution of commitments(
SC , λ
)
and the converging sequences
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
n
→n→∞ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) and (n > 0)n →n→∞ 0. The equilib-
rium (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ a∗) is robust if there exists κ > 0 and a bounded sequence 0 < (κn)n < κ, such that for each
n, (1) ασn (θn) (a∗) > 1− κn · n, and (2) for each signal profile θ ∈ O(SNn ∪SC),
ασn (θ) (a∗) ≥ 1− κn · n ⇒ ασ
(
f((1−)·σn+·λ)θ
)
(a∗) > 1− κn · n.
The proof of Part 2 of Theorem 2 contains a detailed argument as to why the cooperative equilibrium of
Theorem 2 is robust. The argument as to why all other cooperative equilibria in Theorems 3–5 are robust is
analogous. (It is immediate that the defective perfect equilibrium of Proposition 1 satisfies robustness because
the behavior of the normal agents is independent of what these agents observe.)
E Proofs
E.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Defection is Perfect)
We will prove a stronger result, namely, that defection is a strictly perfect equilibrium action (as defined in
Appendix D.1), i.e., that it is a perfect equilibrium action with respect to all distributions of commitment
strategies. Let ζ =
(SC , λ) be a distribution of commitments. Let sd ≡ d be the strategy that always defects.
Let ({sd} , θn) be a steady state of the perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
. The fact that an agent
who follows sd ≡ d always defects implies that (θn)sd (k) = 1 (i.e., the agent is always observed to defect in
all k interactions). Consider a deviating agent (Alice) who follows any strategy s 6= sd. We show that Alice is
strictly outperformed in any post-deviation steady state.
The facts that s 6= sd and that all signals are observed with positive probability in any perturbed environment
imply that Alice cooperates with an average probability of α > 0. We now compare the payoff of Alice to the
payoff of an incumbent (Bob) who follows sd. Alice obtains a direct loss of at least α·min (g, l) due to cooperating
with probability α. The maximal indirect benefit that she might achieve due to these cooperations (by inducing
committed agents to cooperate against her with higher probability relative to their cooperation probability
against Bob) is n · k ·α · (l + 1) because there are n committed agents, each of whom observes Alice cooperate
at least once in the k sampled actions with a probability of at most k · α, and each committed partner can
yield Alice a benefit of at most l + 1 by cooperating when the partner observes m ≥ 1. If n is sufficiently
small (n < 1k·(l+1) ), then the direct loss is larger than the indirect maximal benefit (α > n · k · α · (l + 1)).
This implies that ({sd} , θn) is a (strict) Nash equilibrium in any environment with n < 1k·(l+1) , which proves
defection is a strictly perfect equilibrium action.
E.2 Proof of Theorem 1 (Defection is the Unique Equilibrium in Offensive PDs)
Let (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) be a regular perfect equilibrium. That is, there exists a regular distribution of commit-
ments
(SC , λ), a converging sequence (n)n → 0, and a converging sequence of steady states (SNn , σn, θn) →
(S∗, σ∗, θ∗), such that for each n the state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
is a Nash equilibrium of
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
. We
assume to the contrary that S∗ 6= {d}.
Recall that any signalm ∈M = {0, ..., k} is observed with positive probability in any perturbed environment.
Given a state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
, an environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
, a signal m ∈ M , and a strategy s ∈ SNn , let
q (m, s) denote the probability that a randomly drawn partner of a player defects, conditional on the player
following strategy s and observing signal m about the partner.
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We say that a strategy is “defector-favoring” if the strategy is to defect against partners who are likely
to cooperate, and to cooperate against partners who are likely to defect. Specifically, a strategy is defector-
favoring if there is some threshold such that the strategy is to cooperate (defect) when the partner’s conditional
probability of defecting is above (below) this threshold. Formally:
Definition 19. Strategy s ∈ SNn is defector-favoring, given state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
and environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
,
if there is some q¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that, for each m ∈M , q (m, s) > q¯ ⇒ sm (d) = 0, and q (m, s) < q¯ ⇒ sm (d) =
1.
The rest of the proof consists of the following four steps.
First, we show that all normal strategies are defector-favoring. Assume to the contrary that there is a strategy
s ∈ SNn that is not defector-favoring. Let s′ be a defector-favoring strategy that has the same average defection
probability as s in the post-deviation steady state. The fact that both strategies prescribe defection with the
same average probability implies that they induce the same behavior from the partners (since these partners
observe identical distributions of signals when facing s and when facing s′), and hence q (m, s) = q (m, s′).
Agents who follow strategy s′ defect more often against partners who are more likely to cooperate relative to
strategy s. Since the underlying game is offensive this implies that strategy s′ strictly outperforms strategy s,
which contradicts that
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Second, we show that all the normal strategies lead agents to defect with the same average probability
in
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
. Assume to the contrary that there are strategies s, s′ ∈ SNn such that agents following the
former strategy have a higher average probability of defection, i.e., α (θs) (d) > α (θs′) (d). Let β = α (θs) (d)−
α (θs′) (d). Note that agents who follow strategy s have a strictly higher payoff than agents who follow s′ when
being matched with normal partners. This is because strategy s yields: (1) a strictly higher direct payoff of
at least β · l due to playing more often the dominant action d, and (2) a weakly higher payoff against normal
agents, because the fact that agents who follow it defect more often and all normal agents follow defector-
favoring strategies implies that normal partners defect with a weakly smaller probability when being matched
with agents who follow strategy s (relative to s′). We also need to consider what happens when normal agents
are matched with committed agents. The maximal indirect gain that followers of strategy s′ have relative to
followers of strategy s, due to inducing a higher probability of cooperation from committed partners, is at most
n · (l + 1) · k · β. This implies that if n < l(l+1)·k , then followers of strategy s have a strictly higher payoff than
followers of s′, which contradicts that
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Third, we argue that for any normal agent it is the case that the probability that the partner defects
conditional on the agent observing signal m = k is weakly larger than the probability that the partner defects
conditional on the agent observing any signal m < k. To see why, note that the regularity of the set of
commitments implies that not all commitment strategies have the same defection probabilities, and thus the
signal about the partner yields some information about the partner’s probability of defecting. The previous
step shows that all normal agents defect with the same probability, which implies that they induce the same
signal distribution, and thus they induce the same behavior from all partners. Combining this fact with the
fact that not all commitment strategies have the same defection probability implies (for a sufficiently small n)
that if a player observes a signal that includes only defections, then the partner is more likely to have a higher
average defection probability against normal agents (i.e., q (m, s) < q (k, s) for any normal strategy s and any
m < k).
Thus, any normal agent (who follows a defector-favoring strategy due to the first step) defects with a weakly
lower probability after observing signal m = k. This implies that if n is sufficiently small, then a deviator
who always defects outperforms the incumbents. The deviator achieves a direct higher payoff by defecting more
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often, as well as a weakly higher indirect gain by inducing the incumbents to cooperate more often.
E.3 Proof of Theorem 2 (Cooperation Is Perfect in Defensive PDs)
Part 1: Let (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ 0) be a perfect equilibrium. This implies that there exist a distribution of com-
mitments
(
SC , λ
)
, a converging sequence of strictly positive commitment levels n →n→∞ 0, and a converging
sequence of steady states
(
SNn , σn, θn
) →n→∞ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗), such that for each n the state (SNn , σn, θn) is a
Nash equilibrium of the perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
. The fact that the equilibrium induces full
cooperation (in the limit when n →n→∞ 0) implies that all normal agents must cooperate when they observe
no defections, i.e., s0 (c) = 1 for each s ∈ S∗.
Next we show that s1 (d) > 0 for some s ∈ S∗. Assume to the contrary that s1 (d) = 0 for every s ∈ S∗. This
implies that for any δ > 0, if n is sufficiently large then
∑
s∈SNn σn (s) · s1 (d) < δ. Consider a deviator (Alice)
who follows a strategy s′ that defects with a small probability α, satisfyingn, δ << α << 1, when observing
no defections (i.e., s′0 (d) = α). It turns out that Alice will outperform the incumbents. To see this note that
since she occasionally defects when observing m = 0 she obtains a direct gain of at least α ·g·Pr (m = 0), where
Pr (m = 0) is the probability of observing m = 0 given the steady state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
. The probability that a
partner observes her defecting twice or more is
∑k
i=2
(
k
i
)
αi · (1− α)k−i. This implies that her indirect loss
from these defections is at most
(∑k
i=2
(
k
i
)
αi · (1− α)k−i + δ + n
)
·(1 + l) and, thus, for sufficiently small
values n, δ << α << 1, Alice strictly outperforms the incumbents.
We now show that sm (d) = 1 for all s ∈ S∗ and all m ≥ 2. The fact that θ∗ ≡ 0 implies that for a
sufficiently large n, all normal agents cooperate with an average probability very close to one and, thus, the
average probability of defection by an agent who follows a strategy s ∈ S ∪ SC is very close to s0 (d). Hence
the distribution of signals induced by such an agent is very close to νs0(d). Recall that we assume that the
distribution of commitments contains at least one strategy s with s0 (d) > 0. This implies that the posterior
probability that the partner is going to defect is strictly increasing in the signal m that the agent observes about
the partner. Note that the direct gain from defecting is strictly increasing in the probability that the partner
defects as well (due to the game being defensive), while the indirect influence of defection (on the behavior of
future partners who may observe the current defection) is independent of the partner’s play. From the previous
paragraph we know that defection is a best reply conditional on an agent observing m = 1. This implies that
defection must be the unique best reply when an agent observes at least two defections (i.e., when m ≥ 2).
It remains to show that there is a normal incumbent strategy to cooperate with positive probability after
observing a single defection, i.e., s1 (d) < 1 for some s ∈ S∗. Assume to the contrary that s1 (d) = 1 for
every s ∈ S∗. Let rn denote the average probability that a normal agent defects after observing m ≥ 1.
Since
(
SNn , σn, θn
) →n→∞ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗) , the assumption that s1 (d) = 1 for all s ∈ S∗ implies that rn > 0.6
for a sufficiently large n. Let Pr
(
m ≥ 1|SNn
)
denote the probability of observing m ≥ 1 conditional on being
matched with a normal partner. Note that the assumption that sˆ0 (d) > 0 for some committed strategy sˆ
and the assumption that s1 (d) > 0 for some normal strategy together imply that Pr
(
m ≥ 1|SNn
)
> 0. Note
that θ∗ ≡ c implies that limn→∞
(
Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
))
= 0. Hence Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
is O (n). We can calculate
Pr
(
m ≥ 1|SNn
)
as follows:
Pr
(
m ≥ 1|SNn
)
= k·((1− n) · rn · Pr (m ≥ 1|SNn )+ n · λ (sˆ) · (sˆ0 (d) +O (n)))−O (2n)−O ((Pr (m ≥ 1|SNn ))2) .
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The reason for this equation is as follows. The observed signal induced by a normal agent (Bob) describes his
actions in k interactions. In each of these interactions Bob’s partner was normal with a probability of 1−n, and
was committed with a probability of n. If Bob’s partner in an interaction was normal then she defected with
a probability of rn when she observed m ≥ 1 (which happened with a probability of Pr
(
m ≥ 1|SNn
)
). If Bob’s
partner in an interaction was committed then she followed strategy sˆ with a probability of λ (sˆ) and defected
with a probability of sˆ0 (d) + O (n) (as argued above, the average defection probability of an agent following
strategy s should be close to s0 (d)). Finally, the terms −O
(
2n
) − O ((Pr (m ≥ 1|SNn ))2) are subtracted to
avoid “double-counting” cases in which Bob has defected more than once. Rearranging and simplifying the
above equation by using the fact that
(
Pr
(
m ≥ 1|SNn
))2 is O (2n) yields
(1− k · (1− n) · rn) · Pr
(
m ≥ 1|SNn
)
= k · (n · λ (sˆ) · sˆ0 (d)) .
Then use rn > 0.6 to infer that the LHS is negative. This contradicts the fact that the RHS is positive.
Part 2: We prove a stronger result, namely, that cooperation is a strictly perfect equilibrium action (as defined
in Appendix D.1), i.e., that it is a perfect equilibrium action with respect to all distributions of commitment
strategies. Recall that s1 (s2) is the strategy that induces an agent to defect iff the agent observes m ≥ 1
(m ≥ 2). Let 0 < q < 1k·(l+1) be a probability that will be defined later. Let sq be the strategy that induces an
agent to defect with a probability of q iff the agent observes m = 1, to defect for sure if she observes m ≥ 2, and
to cooperate for sure if she observes m = 0. Let
(
SC , λ
)
be an arbitrary distribution of commitments. We will
show that there exist a converging sequence of commitment levels n → 0 and converging sequences of steady
states
ψn ≡
({
s1, s2
}
, σn = (qn, 1− qn) , θn
)→n→∞ ψ∗ ≡ ({s1, s2} , (q, 1− q) , θ ≡ 0) ,
and
ψ′n ≡ ({sqn} , θ′n)→n→∞ ψ′∗ ≡ ({sq} , θ′ ≡ 0) ,
such that either (1) for each n the steady state ψn is a Nash equilibrium of
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
, or (2) for each
n the steady state ψ′n is a Nash equilibrium of
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
.
Fix an n ≥ 1 such that n is sufficiently small. (Exactly what counts as sufficiently small will become
clear below.) In what follows, we calculate a number of probabilities while relying on the fact that n << 1.
Thus we neglect terms of O (n) (resp., O
(
2n
)
) when the leading term is O (1) (resp., O (n)). The calculations
give the same results for ψn as for ψ′n. Since we are looking for consistent signal profiles θn and θ′n such that
θn →n→∞ θ ≡ 0 and θ′n →n→∞ θ′ ≡ 0, we assume that (θn)si (0) = 1 − O (n) for each si, sj ∈
{
s1, s2
}
in ψn
and assume that (θ′n)sq (0) = 1−O (n) in ψ′n.
We begin by confirming that indeed there exist consistent signal profiles θn and θ′n in which the normal agents
almost always cooperate (the argument also implies that the steady states ψn and ψ′n satisfy the robustness
refinement defined in Appendix D.3). Consider a perturbed signal profile θ ∈ O(SNn ∪SC). Recall (Appendix
D.3) that ασn (θ) (d) is the (σn-weighted) average of the distributions of actions that induce signals distributed
according to the signal profile θ for the normal agents, i.e.,
ασn (θ) (d) = qn · α (θs1) (d) + (1− qn) · α (θs2) (d) (ασn (θ) (d) = α (θsq ) (d)).
The (possibly inconsistent) “old” perturbed signal profile θ and the strategy distribution of the incumbents
jointly induce a “new” signal profile f(1−n)·σn+n·λ (θ) (where the dynamic mapping between states, f , is as
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defined in Appendix C.1) . The average defection probability of a normal agent in this “new” signal profile is
bounded by the following inequality:
ασn
(
f(1−n)·σn+n·λ (θ)
)
(d) < (1− n) ·
(
qn · k · ασn (θ) (d) +
(
k
2
)
· (ασn (θ) (d))2
)
+ n. (14)
This is so because a normal agent, when being matched with a normal partner (which happens with a probability
of (1− n)) defects with an average probability of qn when she observes a single defection (which happens with
a probability strictly less than k ·ασn (θ) ), and defects for sure when she observes at least two defections (which
happens with a probability strictly less than
(
k
2
)
· (ασn (θ))2). Consider the parabolic equation, which is
based on substituting
x = ασn (θ) (d) = ασn
(
f(1−n)·σn+n·λ (θ)
)
(d)
in (14), and changing the inequality into an equality:
x = (1− n) ·
(
qn · k · x+
(
k
2
)
· x2
)
+ n ⇔ 0 =
(
k
2
)
· x2 − (1− (1− n) · qn · k) · x+ n.
Recall that a parabolic equation A · x2 − B · x + C = 0 with A,B,C > 0 and C << A,B has two positive
solutions, the smaller of which is
x1 =
B −√B2 − 4 ·A · C
2 ·A ≈
B −
√
B2 − 2 ·B · 2·A·CB +
( 2·A·C
B
)2
2 ·A =
B − (B − 2·A·CB )
2 ·A =
2·A·C
B
2 ·A =
C
B
= n1− (1− n) · qn · k = κn · n,
where the penultimate equality is derived by substituting C = n and B = 1 − (1− n) · qn · k, and the last
equality is derived by defining κn = 11−(1−n)·qn·k . Let κ = supnκn < ∞. The upper bound κ is finite due to
the fact that qn → q, k · q < 1l+1 and n → . The definition of x1 = κn · n implies that
ασn (θ) (d) ≤ κn · n ⇒ ασn
(
f(1−n)·σn+n·λ (θ)
)
(d) < κn · n,
which immediately implies the following inequality (which implies the robustness property of the steady state
as defined in Appendix D.3):
ασn (θ) (c) ≥ 1− κn · n ⇒ ασn
(
f(1−n)·σn+n·λ (θ)
)
(c) > 1− κn · n.
Let O({s1,s2}∪SC ,x1) (O(sqn∪SC ,x1)) be the set of signal profiles θ defined over
{
s1, s2
} ∪ SC (sqn ∪ SC)
and satisfying ασn (θ) (d) ≤ x1. Observe that O({s1,s2}∪SC ,x1)(O(sqn∪SC ,x1)) is a convex and compact subset
of a Euclidean space, and that the mapping f(1−n)·σn+n·λ (θ) is continuous. Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem
implies that the mapping f(1−n)·σn+n·λ (θ) has a fixed point θn (θ′n) satisfying ασn (θn) (d) < x1 = O (n)
(ασn (θ′n) (d) ≤ x1 = O (n)), which is a consistent signal profile in which the normal agents almost always
cooperate.
For each incumbent strategy s, let Pr (m = 1|s) (Pr (m ≥ 2|s)) denote the probability of observing exactly
one defection (at least two defections) conditional on the partner following strategy s. Let Pr (m = 1) and
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Pr (m ≥ 2) be the corresponding unconditional probabilities.
The assumption that θn →n→∞ θ ≡ 0 and θ′n →n→∞ θ′ ≡ 0 implies that agents are very likely to observe
the signal m = 0 (i.e., zero defections) when being matched with a random partner. Formally:
Pr (m = 0) = (1−O (n))k = 1−O (n) .
The conditional probabilities of observing m = 0, m = 1, and m ≥ 2, for all s ∈ SNn ∪ SC , are
Pr (m = 0|s) = (s0 (c))k +O (n) ,
P r (m = 1|s) = k · s0 (d) · (s0 (c))k−1 +O (n) ,
P r (m ≥ 2|s) = 1− Pr (m = 0|s)− Pr (m = 1|s) .
Let SNn =
{
s1, s2
}
in ψn and SNn = {sqn} in ψ′n. Given signal m, let Pr
(
m|SNn
)
denote the probability of
observing signal m, conditional on the partner following a normal strategy. Specifically, in the heterogeneous
state ψn (with two normal strategies), this conditional probability is given by
Pr
(
m|SNn
)
= q · Pr (m|s1)+ (1− q) · Pr (m|s2) .
Furthermore, it follows (from the expressions for Pr (m = 0|s), Pr (m = 1|s), and Pr (m ≥ 2|s)) that
Pr
(
m = 0|SNn
)
= 1−O (n) , P r
(
m = 1|SNn
)
= O (n) Pr
(
m ≥ 2|SNn
)
= O
(
2n
)
.
Next we calculate the probability that a normal agent (Alice) generates a signal that contains a single defection.
This happens with probability one if exactly one of the k interactions sampled from Alice’s past was such that
Alice observed her partner in that interaction to have defected at least twice (which implies that her partner
is most likely to have been a committed agent). This happens with probability qn if exactly one of the k
interactions sampled from Alice’s past was such that Alice observed her partner (who might have been either a
committed or a normal agent) to have defected exactly once:
Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
= k ·
∑
s∈SC
n · λ (s) · (Pr (m ≥ 2|s) + qn · Pr (m = 1|s)) .
+k · (1− n) ·
[
qn · Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
+ Pr
(
m ≥ 2|SNn
)]
+O
(
2n
)
.
The final term O
(
2n
)
comes from the very small probability of the partner observing a normal agent to defect
twice. Since Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
= O (n) and Pr
(
m ≥ 2|SNn
)
= O
(
2n
)
, this can be simplified (neglecting O
(
2n
)
)
and rearranged to obtain
Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
=
k · n ·
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · (Pr (m ≥ 2|s) + qn · Pr (m = 1|s))
1− k · q , (15)
which is well defined and O (n) as long as qn < 1/k. We can now calculate the unconditional probabilities:
Pr (m = 1) = n ·
∑
s∈SC
λ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s) + Pr (m = 1|SNn )+O (2n) ,
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Pr (m ≥ 2) = n ·
∑
s∈SC
λ (s) · Pr (m ≥ 2|s) + (1− n) · Pr
(
m ≥ 2|SNn
)
= n ·
∑
s∈SC
λ (s) · Pr (m ≥ 2|s) +O (2n) .
By using Bayes’ rule we can calculate the conditional probability that the partner uses strategy s ∈ SC as a
function of the observed signal:
Pr (s|m = 0) = n · λ (s) · Pr (m = 0|s)
Pr (m = 0) ,
P r (s|m = 1) = n · λ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s)
Pr (m = 1) ,
P r (s|m ≥ 2) = n · λ (s) · Pr (m ≥ 2|s)
Pr (m ≥ 2) .
Note that
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 0) = n ·
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · (s0 (c))k
1−O (n) = O (n) .
From Eq. (15) we have
∑
s∈SNn
σ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s) = Pr (m = 1|SNn ) = k · n ·∑s∈SC λ (s) · (Pr (m ≥ 2|s) + q · Pr (m = 1|s))1− k · qn .
We use this to obtain, by Bayes’ rule,
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 1) = n ·
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s)
n ·
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s) +
k·n·
∑
s∈SC λ(s)·(Pr(m≥2|s)+qn·Pr(m=1|s))
1−k·qn +O (
2
n)
=
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s)∑
s∈SC λ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s) +
k·
∑
s∈SC λ(s)·(Pr(m≥2|s)+qn·Pr(m=1|s))
1−k·qn +O (
2
n) .
Note that the terms
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s) and
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · (Pr (m ≥ 2|s)) do not vanish as n → 0.
Moreover, we will see below (Eqs. (17) and (18)) that this implies that qn also does not vanish as n → 0.
Together, these observations imply that there are numbers a, b ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all n, it is the case that
0 < a <
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 1) < b < 1. (16)
Furthermore
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m ≥ 2) = 1
1 +
∑
s∈SNn
σ(s)·Pr(m≥2|s)
n·
∑
s∈SC λ(s)·Pr(m≥2|s)
= 1
1 + O(
2
n)
O(n)
= 11 +O (n)
.
Hence for a sufficiently large n, the more defections there are in the observed signal, the higher is the conditional
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probability that the partner is committed:∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 0) <
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 1) <
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m ≥ 2) .
Let Pr
(
SNn |m = 1
)
=
∑
s∈SNn Pr (s|m = 1) denote the conditional probability that the partner follows a
normal strategy conditional on the agent observing signal m = 1. Eq. (16) implies that there are numbers
a′, b′ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all n, it is the case that 0 < a′ < Pr (SNn |m = 1) < b′ < 1 (because Pr (SNn |m = 1)+∑
s∈SC Pr (s|m = 1) = 1).
Let µn be the probability that a random partner defects conditional on a player observing signal m = 1
about the partner, and conditional on the partner observing the signal m = 0:
µn =
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 1) · s0 (d) +O (n) . (17)
Eq. (17) defines µn as a strictly decreasing function of qn. To see this, note that the term s0 (d) does not
depend on qn, and in Pr (s|m = 1) = n·λ(s)·Pr(m=1|s)Pr(m=1) the numerator does not depend on qn, whereas the term
Pr (m = 1) is increasing in qn.
Next we calculate the value of qn that balances the payoff of both actions after a player observes a single
defection (neglecting terms of O
(
2n
)
). The LHS of the following equation represents the player’s direct gain
from defecting when she observes a single defection, while the RHS represents the player’s indirect loss induced
by partners who defect as a result of observing these defections:
Pr (m = 1) · (µn · l + (1− µn) · g) = Pr (m = 1) · (k · q · (l + 1) +O (n))⇒ qn = µn · l + (1− µn) · g
k · (l + 1) +O (n) .
(18)
Note that Eq. (18) defines qn as a strictly increasing function of µn. This implies that there are unique values
of qn and µn satisfying gk·(l+1) < qn <
l
k·(l+1) <
1
k and 0 < µn < 1, which jointly solve Eqs. (17) and (18).
This pair of parameters balances the payoff of both actions when a player observes a signal m = 1. Note that
sequences of (qn)n → q and (µn)n → µ converge to the values that solve the above equations when ignoring the
terms that are O (n).
Observe that defection is the unique best reply when a player observes at least two defections. The direct
gain from defecting is larger than the LHS of Eq. (18), and the indirect loss is still given by the RHS of Eq.
(18). The reason that the direct gain is larger is that normal partners almost never defect twice or more (the
probability is O
(
2n
)
), and thus the partner is most likely committed and will defect with a probability that
is higher than µn (since µn also gives weight to normal strategies that are most likely to cooperate). More
generally, note that given that the normal agents almost always cooperate, the average probability of defection
of each agent who follows strategy s is s0 (d) +O (n). This implies that for a sufficient small n, the higher m
is, the higher the partner’s value s0 (d) is likely to be. Hence the higher m is, the higher the probability is that
the partner will defect against a normal agent. Thus the direct gain from defection is increasing in the signal m
that the normal agent observes about her partner. (A formal detailed proof of this statement is available upon
request.)
Next, consider a deviator (Alice) who defects with a probability of α > 0 after she observes m = 0. In what
follows we calculate Alice’s expected payoff as a function of α in any post-deviation stable state, neglecting
terms of O (n) throughout the calculation. Note that Alice’s partner observes signal m = 1 with a probability
of k · α · (1− α)k−1, and observes signal m ≥ 2 with a probability of 1 − (1− α)k − k · α · (1− α)k−1. This
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implies that the mean probability that a normal partner defects against a mutant is
h (α) :=
(
k · α · (1− α)k−1
)
· q + 1− (1− α)k − k · α · (1− α)k−1 = 1− (1− α)k−1 (1− α+ k · α · (1− q)) .
Thus the expected payoff of the mutant is
pi (α) : = (1− h (α)) · α · (1 + g) + (1− h (α)) · (1− α)− h (α) · (1− α) · l
= 1 + α · g − h (α) · (1 + (1− α) · l + α · g) .
Direct numeric calculation of ∂pi(α)∂α reveals that pi (α) is strictly decreasing in α for each q >
g
k·(l+1) . Thus any
deviator with α > 0 earns strictly less than the incumbents (who have α = 0).
We have now shown that the best reply is c after observing m = 0 and d after observing m ≥ 2. After
observing m = 1 both c and d are best replies provided that q has the required value. That is, we know what
the aggregate probability of defection after a player observes m = 1 has to be in equilibrium. However, we do
not know whether mixing will occur at the individual level. We now turn to this question.
Let χ be the probability that a random partner defects conditional on both the agent and the partner
observing a single defection (in the limit as n → 0):
χ = lim
n→∞
(∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 1) · s1 (d) + Pr (SNn |m = 1) · q
)
.
We conclude by showing that if χ > µ (χ < µ), then ψ∗ (ψ′∗) is a perfect equilibrium. This is so because if
χ > µ (χ < µ), then conditional on a normal agent observing a single defection, the partner is more (less)
likely to defect the higher the probability with which the agent defects when she observes a single defection
(because then it is more likely that the partner observes a single defection rather than only cooperation). This
implies that when a player observes a single defection, the higher the agent’s own defection probability is, the
more profitable defection is (recall that the higher the probability is of the defection of the partner, the higher
the direct gain from defection, whereas the indirect loss is independent of the partner’s behavior). That is,
an agent’s payoff is a strictly convex (concave) function of the agent’s defection probability conditional on him
observing a single defection. This implies that a deviator who mixes on the individual level (i.e., defects with
probabilities different from q) is outperformed when χ > µ (χ < µ)).
Note that the normal agents are more likely to defect against a partner who is more likely to defect when
she observes a single defection. This implies that when focusing only on normal partners, the induced level of
χ is larger than the induced level of µ. It is only the committed agents who may induce the opposite inequality
(namely, χ < µ). Thus, if in the limit as → 0 the equality χ = µ holds, then it must be that for any positive
small share of committed agents n, it is the case that χn < µn, which implies by the argument above that the
state ψ′n is a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 5. The above argument shows that when χ < µ, each state ψ′n is a strictly perfect equilibrium (any
deviator who follows a strategy different from sqn obtains a strictly lower payoff). In the opposite case of χ > µ,
one can show that an agent who follows strategy si achieves a higher payoff than an agent who follows s−i,
conditional on the partner following si. This implies that the mixed equilibrium between the strategies of s1
and x2 is Hawk-Dove-like, and that the state ψn is evolutionarily stable (see Appendix D). This shows that
cooperation is robust also to joint deviation of a small group of agents, and that it satisfies the refinement
of evolutionary stability defined in Appendix D (namely, cooperation is a strictly perfect evolutionarily stable
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action).
E.4 Proof of Proposition 4 (Observing a Single Action)
Arguments and pieces of notation that are analogous to the ones used in the proof of Theorem 2 are presented
in brief or skipped. Let sc ≡ c be the strategy that always cooperates. The same arguments as in Theorem 2
show that the only possible candidates for perfect equilibria that support full cooperation are steady states of
the form ψ =
({
s1, sc
}
, (q, 1− q) , θ ≡ 0) or ψ′ = ({sq} , θ′ ≡ 0).
Consider a perturbed environment
(
(GPD, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, 
)
where  > 0 is sufficiently small. In what follows:
(1) for the case of g ≤ βC,λ we characterize a Nash equilibrium of this perturbed environment that is within
a distance of O () from either ψ or ψ′, and (2) we show that no such Nash equilibrium exists for the case of
g > βC,λ.
Consider a steady state that is within a distance of O () from either ψ or ψ′. The fact that the behavior in
the steady state is close to always cooperating (i.e., to θ ≡ 0) implies that the probability of observing m = 1
conditional on the partner following a commitment strategy s ∈ SC is:
Pr (m = 1|s) = s0 (d) +O () .
Similarly, the probability of observing m = 1 conditional on the partner being normal is
Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
= q ·
(
 ·
∑
s∈SC
λ (s) · s0 (d) + (1− ) · Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
))
+O
(
2
)⇒
Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
=
 · q ·∑s∈SC λ (s) · s0 (d)
1− q +O
(
2
)
.
By using Bayes’ rule we can calculate the probability that the partner uses strategy s ∈ SC conditional on
observing m = 1:
Pr (s|m = 1) = n · λ (s) · Pr (m = 1|s)
Pr (m = 1) =
 · λ (s) · s0 (d)
 ·
(∑
s∈SC λ (s) · s0 (d) +
q·
∑
s∈SC λ(s)·s0(d)
1−q
) +O ()⇒
Pr (s|m = 1) = (1− q) · λ (s) · s0 (d)∑
s∈SC λ (s) · s0 (d)
+O () .
Let µ be the probability that a random partner defects conditional on an agent observing signal m = 1 about
the partner, and conditional on the partner observing the signal m = 0 about the agent. (Note that only
committed partners defect with positive probability when observing m = 0.)
µ =
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 1) · s0 (d) +O () = (1− q) ·
∑
s∈SC λ (s) · (s0 (d))2∑
s∈SC λ (s) · s0 (d)
+O () = (1− q) ·β(SC ,λ) +O () . (19)
Next we calculate the value of q that balances the payoff of both actions after a player observes a single defection.
The LHS of the following equation represents the player’s direct gain from defecting when she observes a single
defection, while the RHS represents the player’s indirect loss induced by future partners who defect as a result
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of observing these defections:
Pr (m = 1) · (µ · l + (1− µ) · g) +O () = Pr (m = 1) · (q · (l + 1) +O ())⇒ (20)
q = µ · l + (1− µ) · g
l + 1 +O () =
g + µ · (l − g)
l + 1 +O () . (21)
Substituting (19) in (21) yields
q =
g + (1− q) · (l − g) · β(SC ,λ)
l + 1 +O ()⇒ q · (l + 1) = g + (1− q) · (l − g) · β(SC ,λ) +O ()
⇒ q = g + (l − g) · β(SC ,λ)
l + 1 + (l − g) · β(SC ,λ)
+O () .
Consider a deviator (Alice) who always defects. Normal partners of Alice cooperate with a probability of
1 − q. This implies that Alice gets an expected payoff of (1 + g) · (1− q), while the normal agents each get a
payoff of 1 +O (). Alice is outperformed iff (neglecting terms of O ()):
(1 + g) · (1− q) ≤ 1⇔ q ≥ g1 + g ⇔
g + (l − g) · β(SC ,λ)
l + 1 + (l − g) · β(SC ,λ)
≥ g1 + g
⇔ (1 + g) · (g + (l − g) · β(SC ,λ)) ≥ g · (l + 1 + (l − g) · β(SC ,λ))
⇔ g2 + (l − g) · β(SC ,λ)+ ≥ g · l ⇔ g · (l − g) ≤ (l − g) · β(SC ,λ) ⇔ g ≤ β(SC ,λ).
Thus, the steady state can be a Nash equilibrium only if g ≤ β(SC ,λ). It is relatively straightforward to show
that if g ≤ β(SC ,λ), then a deviator who defects with probability α when observing m = 0 is outperformed. The
remaining steps of the proof are as in the proof of part 2 of Theorem 2, and are omitted for brevity.
E.5 Proof of Theorem 3 (Observing Conflicts)
The proof of part 1(a) is analogous to Theorem 2 and is omitted for brevity. We now prove a stronger version
of part 1(b), namely, that cooperation is a strictly perfect equilibrium action in any mild game (i.e., it is a
perfect equilibrium action with respect to all distributions of commitment strategies, as defined in Appendix
D.1). Arguments and notations that are analogous to the proof of Theorem 2 are presented in brief. Let s1
(s2) be the strategy that instructs a player to defect if and only if she receives a signal containing one or more
(two or more) conflicts. Consider the following candidate for a perfect equilibrium
({
s1, s2
}
, (q, 1− q) , θ∗ = 0).
Here, the probability q will be determined such that both actions are best replies when an agent observes a
single conflict.
Let
(SC , λ) be a distribution of commitments. We show that there exists a converging sequence of levels
n → 0, and converging sequences of steady states
({
s1, s2
}
, (qn, 1− qn) , θn
) → ({s1, s2} , (q, 1− q) , θ ≡ 0)
and ({sqn} , θ′n) → ({sq} , θ′ ≡ 0) such that either (1) each steady state ψn ≡
({
s1, s2
}
, σn ≡ (qn, 1− qn) , θn
)
is a Nash equilibrium of
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
, or (2) each steady state ψ′n ≡ ({sqn} , θ′n) is a Nash equilibrium
of
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
.
Fix n ≥ 1. Assume that n is sufficiently small. We calculate the probability Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
that a normal
agent (Alice) induces a signal m = 1. Since we focus on the steady states in which the incumbents defect
very rarely (i.e., θn and θ′n converge to θ∗ ≡ 0), we can assume that Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
is O (n). (The proof of
the existence of consistent signal profiles in which the normal agents almost always cooperate in mild PDs is
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analogous to the argument presented in the proof of Theorem 2, and is omitted for brevity). Alice may be
involved in a conflict if one of her k partners is committed, which happens with a probability of O (n). If all
of the k partners are normal, then at each interaction both Alice and her partner defect with a probability
of Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
, which implies that the probability of a conflict is 2 · Pr (m = 1|SNn )− (Pr (m = 1|SNn )2).
Therefore:
Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
= k ·
(
O (n) + 2 · qn · Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)−O ((Pr (m = 1|SNn ))2)) .
Solving this equation, while neglecting terms that are O
(
2n
)
(including Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)2), yields
Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
= k ·O (n)1− 2 · k · qn , (22)
which is well defined and O (n) as long as qn < 12·k . Note that as qn approaches
1
2·k , the value of Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
“explodes” (becomes arbitrarily larger than terms that are O (n)).
By Bayes’ rule we can calculate the conditional probability Pr (s|m = 1) of being matched with each strategy
s ∈ SC (same calculations as detailed in the proof of Theorem 2). Note that these conditional probabilities
are decreasing in Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
, and thus decreasing in qn. Let µn be the probability that a random partner
defects conditional on a player observing signal m = 1 about the partner, and conditional on the partner
observing the signal m = 0:
µn =
∑
s∈SC
Pr (s|m = 1) · s0 (d) +O (n) . (23)
Note that µn is decreasing in qn. Moreover, as qn ↗ 12·k , we have µn (qn) ↘ 0, because Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
“explodes” as we approach the threshold of k · q = 0.5.
Next, we calculate the value of qn that balances the payoffs of both actions when a player observes a single
conflict (neglecting terms of O (n)). The LHS of the following equation represents a player’s direct gain from
defecting when observing a single conflict, while the RHS represents the player’s indirect loss from defecting
in this case, which is induced by normal partners who defect as a result of observing these defections. Note
that the cost is paid only if the partner cooperated, because otherwise a future partner would observe a conflict
regardless of the agent’s own action.
Pr (m = 1)·(µn · l + (1− µn) · g) = Pr (m = 1)·(1− µn)·k·q·(l + 1)+O (n) ⇔ qn = µn · l + (1− µn) · g(1− µ) · k · (l + 1) +O (n) .
(24)
In connection with Eq. (24) it was noted that q (µ) is increasing in µn, and since the game is mild we have
qn (0) = gk·(l+1) <
1
2·k . This implies that there is a unique pair of values of qn ∈
(
g
k·(l+1) ,
1
2·k
)
and µn ∈ (0, 1)
that jointly solve Eqs. (23) and (24). This pair of values balances the payoff of both actions when a player
observes a signal m = 1. Note that sequences of (qn)n → q and (µn)n → µ converge to the values that solve the
above equations when one ignores the terms that are O (n). The remaining arguments of part 1 are analogous
to those in the final part of the proof of Theorem 2, and are omitted for brevity.
Next, we deal with Part (2), namely, the case of an acute Prisoner’s Dilemma (g > 0.5 · (l + 1)). Assume (in
order to obtain a contradiction) that the environment admits a perfect equilibrium (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ c). That is,
there exists a converging sequence of strictly positive commitment levels n →n→∞ 0, and a converging sequence
of steady states
(
SNn , σn, θn
)→n→∞ (S∗, σ∗, θ∗), such that each state (SNn , σn, θn) is a Nash equilibrium of the
perturbed environment
(
(G, k) ,
(
SC , λ
)
, n
)
. By the arguments of part 1 (and the arguments of part 1(a) of
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Theorem 2), the average probability qn by which a normal agent defects when observing m = 1 in the steady
state
(
SNn , σn, θn
)
(for a sufficiently small n) should be at least equal to the minimal solution of Eq. (24):
qn (µn = 0) = gk·(l+1) +O (n). However, if the game is acute, then this minimal solution is larger than
1
2·k , and
Eq. (22) cannot be satisfied by Pr
(
m = 1|SNn
)
<< 1, which yields a contradiction.
E.6 Proof of Theorem 4 (Observing Action Profiles)
Recall that a signal m ∈M consists of information about the number of times in which each of the possible four
action profiles have been played in the sampled k interactions. Let u (m) be the number of sampled interactions
in which the partner has been the sole defector, and let d (m) denote the number of sampled interactions in
which at least of one of the players has defected. Let s1 and s2 be defined as follows:
s1 (m) =
d u (m) = 1 or d (m) ≥ 2c otherwise s2 (m) =
d d (m) ≥ 2c otherwise.
That is, both strategies induce agents to defect if the partner has been involved in at least two interactions
in which the outcome has not been mutual cooperation. In addition, agents who follow s1 defect also when
observing the partner to be the sole defector in a single interaction.
Assume first that GPD is mild (i.e., g ≤ l+12 ). Fix a small probability of 0 < α << 1k . Let sα ≡ α
be the strategy to defect with a probability of α regardless of the signal. In what follows, we show that
there exist a converging sequence of commitment levels n → 0 and converging sequences of steady states
ψn ≡
({
s1, s2
}
, (qn, 1− qn) , θn
)→ ({s1, s2} , (q, 1− q) , θ∗ ≡ −−→(c, c)), such that each steady state ψn is a Nash
equilibrium of ((G, k) , ({sα} , 1sα) , n).
Remark 6. To simplify the notations below we focus on the non-regular distribution of commitments ({sα}).
Note, however, that our arguments can be adapted in a straightforward way to deal with the regular distribution
of commitments
({
sα−δ, sα+δ
}
,
( 1
2 ,
1
2
))
for any 0 < δ << α, in which the each committed agent defects with a
probability very close to α. The same is also true for the proof of Theorem 5below.
Fix a sufficiently small n << 1. Let µn be the probability that the partner defects conditional on (1)
the agent observing a single unilateral defection and k − 1 mutual cooperations, i.e., mˆ =
{
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
}
(u (m) = d (m) = 1), and (2) the partner observing k mutual cooperations. The parameter qn is defined such
that it balances the direct gain of defection (LHS of the equation) and its indirect loss (RHS) for a normal agent
who almost always cooperates:
Pr (mˆ)·µn ·l+(1− µ)·g = Pr (mˆ)·(1− µn)·k ·qn ·(l + 1)+O (n) ⇔ qn = µn · l + (1− µn) · g(1− µn) · k · (l + 1) +O (n) . (25)
The equation is the same as in the case of observation of conflicts; see Eq. (24) above. In particular, note that the
indirect cost of defection when the current partner cooperates is only O (n), because it influences only the behav-
ior of normal future partners if they observe an additional interaction different from (c, c) in the k sampled inter-
actions, which happens only with a probability of O (n). Next, note that µn = α ·Pr
(
sα| (d, c) ,−−→(c, c)
)
+O (n)
because the only agents who follow sα defect with positive probability when observing k mutual cooperations.
Substituting this in (25) yields
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qn =
g + α · Pr
(
sα| (d, c) ,−−→(c, c)
)
· (l − g)(
1− α · Pr
(
sα| (d, c) ,−−→(c, c)
))
· k · (l + 1)
+O (n) =
g
k · (l + 1) +O (α) +O (n) .
The mildness of the game (g < l+12 ) implies that k · qn < 0.5.
Let pn be the average probability with which the normal agents defect when being matched with committed
agents. When α << 1k , the s2-agents rarely (O
(
α2
)
) defect against the committed agents, because it is rare to
observe these committed agents defecting more than once. The s1-agents defect against the committed agents
with a probability of k · qn ·α+O
(
α2
)
+O (n) because each rare defection of the committed agents is observed
with a probability of k · q by s1-agents. Since α, pn << 1, bilateral defections are very rare (O
(
α2
)
). This
implies that pn = α · k · qn +O
(
α2
)
+O (n) < α2 .
Let rn be the probability that an s1-agent defects against a fellow s1-agent. In each observed interaction,
the s1 partner interacts with a committed (resp., s1, s2) opponent with a probability of n (resp., qn, 1-qn) and
the partner unilaterally defects with a probability of α ·k · qn +O (n) +O
(
α2
)
(resp., rn +O
(
r2n
)
, O
(
n · α2
)
).
This implies that rn solves the following equation:
rn = k · (α · q · δn + q · rn) +O
(
2n
) ⇒ rn = α · k · qn1− k · qn · n +O (2n + α2 · n) < 0.5 · α · n,
where the latter inequality is because k · qn < 0.5. The above calculations show that the total frequency with
which committed agents unilaterally defect (α · n) is higher than the total frequency with which normal agents
unilaterally defect (qn+pn ·δn < α·n). This implies that the probability that an agent is committed, conditional
on his being the sole defector in an interaction, is higher than 50%, and that it is higher than this probability
conditional on her being the sole cooperator. Next, note that mutual defections between a committed agent
and an s1-agent have a frequency of O (n), while mutual defections between two committed agents (or two
normal agents) are very rare (O
(
2n
)
), which implies that the probability that the partner follows a committed
strategy conditional on the player observing mutual defection is 50%+O (n). This implies that
Pr
(
sα| (d, c) ,−−→(c, c)
)
> max
(
Pr
(
sα| (d, d) ,−−→(c, c)
)
, P r
(
sα| (c, d) ,−−→(c, c)
))
,
and thus while both actions are best replies after the player observes the signal
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
, only cooperation
is a best reply after the player observes
(
(d, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
and
(
(c, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
. Next note that conditional on a
player observing a signal with at most k − 2 mutual cooperations, the partner is most likely to be committed
(because normal agents have two outcomes different from mutual cooperation with a probability of only O
(
2n
)
).
This implies that the normal agents play the unique best reply after any signal other than
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
, and
thus any deviator who behaves differently in these cases will be outperformed.
Let χn be the probability that a random partner defects conditional on both the agent and the partner
observing signal
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
. The definitions of strategies sα, s1, and s2 immediately imply that χn > µn, and
analogous arguments to those presented at the end of the proof of Theorem 2 show that deviators who defect with
a probability strictly between zero and one after observing
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
are outperformed (because an agent’s
payoff is a strictly convex function of the agent’s defection probability when observing signal
(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
).
Next assume that the GPD is acute. We have to show that cooperation is not a perfect equilibrium action.
Assume to the contrary that (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ 0) is a perfect equilibrium with respect to distribution of commitments(SC , λ). Let ψn = (SNn , σn, θn) → (S∗, σ∗, 0) be a converging sequence of Nash equilibria in the converging
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sequence of perturbed environments
(
(GPD, k) ,
(SC , λ) , n). Analogous arguments to the proof of part 1(a) of
Theorem 2 show that any perfect equilibrium that implements full cooperation (S∗, σ∗, θ∗ ≡ 0) must satisfy (1)
s−−→(c,c) = c for each s ∈ S∗, (2) if d (m) ≥ 2 then sm = d for each s ∈ S∗, and (3) there are s, s′ ∈ S∗ such that
s{(d,c),−−→(c,c)} (d) > 0 and s{(d,c),−−→(c,c)} (d) < 1.
Let 0 < qn < 1 be the average probability according to which a normal agent defects when she observes{
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
}
. By analogous arguments to those presented above (see Eq. (25)), qn is an increasing function
of µn, and qn (µn = 0) = gk·(l+1) . The acuteness of the game implies that k · qn > g(l+1) > 12 .
Let sβ ∈ SC be a committed strategy that induces an agent who follows it (called an sβ-agent) to defect
with a probability of β > 0 when he observes
(−−→
(c, c)
)
. In what follows, we show that the presence of strategy sβ
induces the normal agents to unilaterally defect more often than sβ-agents. Let pn be the average probability
that normal agents defect against sα-agents in state ψn. This probability pn must solve the following inequality:
1− pn ≥ ((1− β) · (1− pn))k + k · ((1− β) · (1− pn))k−1 · (1− (1− β) · (1− pn)) (26)
+ (1− qn) · k · ((1− β) · (1− pn))k−1 · β · (1− pn) +O (n) .
The LHS of Eq. (26) is the average probability that normal agents cooperate against sβ-agents (recall that
normal agents always defect when they observe at most k−2 mutual cooperations). The normal agents cooperate
with probability one (resp., at most one, qn) if they observe
(−−→
(c, c)
)
(resp.,
(
(d, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
or
(
(c, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
,(
(d, c) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
), which happens with a probability of ((1− β) · (1− pn))k (resp.,
k · ((1− β) · (1− pn))k−1 · (1− (1− β) · (1− pn)), k · ((1− α) · (1− pn))k−1 · α · (1− p)).
Direct numerical analysis of Eq. (26) shows that the minimal pn that solves this inequality (given that
qn >
1
2·k ) is greater than
β
2−β for any β ∈ (0, 1). The total frequency of interactions in which the sβ-agents
unilaterally defect is β · (1− pn) · n · λ (sβ) + O
(
2n
)
. The total frequency of interactions in which normal
agents unilaterally defect against the sβ-agents is pn · (1− β) · n · λ (sβ) + O
(
2n
)
. Eq. (25) shows that
these unilateral defections against sβ-agents induce the normal agents to unilaterally defect among themselves
with a total frequency of pn·(1−β)·n·λ(sβ)1−k·qn + O
(
2n
)
> pn · (1− β) · n · λ (sβ). Finally, note that pn > β2−β⇔
2 ·pn · (1− β) > β · (1− pn) implies that normal agents unilaterally defect (as the indirect result of the presence
of the sβ-agents) more often than sβ-agents.
Next, observe that bilateral defections are most likely to occur in interactions between normal and committed
agents. This is because the probability that both normal agents defect against each other is only O
(
2n
)
. Thus,
when a player observes bilateral defection the partner is more likely to be a committed agent than when the
player observes a unilateral defection by the partner. This implies that all the normal agents defect with
probability one when they observe
(
(d, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
because in this case defection is the unique best reply.
Let wn be the (average) probability that normal agents defect when they observe
(
(c, d) ,
−−→
(c, c)
)
. If wn < 0.5,
then cooperation is the unique best reply for a normal agent who faces a partner who is likely to defect (e.g.,
when the normal agent observes fewer than k − 1 mutual cooperations), and so we get a contradiction. This is
because defecting against a defector yields a direct gain of l and an indirect loss of at least 0.5·k·(l + 1) ≥ l+1 > l
(because this bilateral defection will be observed on average k times, and in at least half of these cases it will
induce the partner to defect, whereas if the agent were cooperating, then he would have induced the partner to
cooperate).
Thus, wn ≥ 0.5⇒ k ·wn > 1. However, in this case, an analogous argument to the one at the end of the proof
of Theorem 3 implies that an arbitrarily small group of mutants who defect with small probability will cause the
incumbents to unilaterally defect with high probability, and thus no focal post-entry population exists, which
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contradicts the assumption that cooperation is neutrally stable.
E.7 Proof of Theorem 5 (Observing Actions against Cooperation)
The construction of the distribution of commitments ({sα}) (or the regular distribution of commitments({
sα−δ, sα+δ
}
,
( 1
2 ,
1
2
))
for 0 < δ << α) and of the perfect equilibrium
({
s1, s2
}
, (q, 1− q) , θ ≡ −−→(c, c)
)
and
most of the arguments are the same as in the proof of Theorem 4, and are omitted for brevity. Fix n suffi-
ciently small. By the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem of 3, the value of qn that balances the payoffs
of s1 and s2 satisfy k · qn < 1 for any underlying Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Recall that pn, the average probability with which the normal agents defect when being matched with com-
mitted agents, satisfies pn = α·k·qn+O
(
α2
)
+O (n) < α. This implies that the probability that an agent is com-
mitted, conditional on her being the sole defector in an interaction, is higher than 50%, conditional on her being
the sole cooperator. Next, observe that α << 1 implies that the probability Pr ((d, d)) = O
(
pn · α2
) ·O (n) <<
Pr ((c, d)) = O (pn · n · α), which implies that conditional on an agent observing the signal
{
(∗, d) ,
(−−→
(c, c)
)}
,
it is most likely that the partner has cooperated rather than defected in the interaction in which (∗, d) has
been observed. This implies that Pr
(
sα|
{
(∗, d) ,
(−−→
(c, c)
)})
< Pr
(
sα|
{
(d, c) ,
(−−→
(c, c)
)})
, and given the value
of qn for which both actions are best replies conditional on observing signal
{
(d, c) ,
(−−→
(c, c)
)}
, cooperation is
the unique best reply when observing either
{
(∗, d) ,
(−−→
(c, c)
)}
or
{(−−→
(c, c)
)}
, while defection is the unique best
reply when observing at most k − 2 mutual cooperations. This implies that ({s1, s2} , (q, 1− q) , θ ≡ 0) is a
perfect equilibrium (where q is the limit of qn when n converges to zero.
E.8 Proof of Theorem 6 (Repeated Game)
Part 1: Assume that g > l (i.e., an offensive game). Assume to the contrary that there exist a sequence of Nash
equilibria of perturbed environments that converge to a perfect equilibrium that induces full cooperation. The
fact that the perfect equilibrium induces full cooperation implies that in any sufficiently close Nash equilibrium
(i.e., for a sufficiently large n):
1. normal agents cooperate with high probability when observing k acts of cooperation;
2. when an agent is matched with a normal partner, the agent most of the time observes k acts of cooperation;
3. when a normal agent observes k acts of cooperation, the partner is most likely normal and he is going to
cooperate with a probability close to one;
4. when an agent observes k acts of defection, the partner has a positive (and non-negligible) probability of
being a committed agent and defecting in the current match.
In order for these facts to be be consistent with equilibrium it must be the case that cooperation is a best reply
against a partner who is most likely to cooperate in the current match; i.e., the direct gain from defecting,
which is very close to g, has to be lower than the future indirect loss, which is independent of the partner’s
action. The inequality g > l then implies that cooperation is the unique best reply against a partner who is
going to cooperate with an expected probability that is not close to 1 (because the direct gain from defecting
is a mixed average of l and g, which is less than g). This, in turn, implies that all normal agents cooperate
with a probability of one when they observe k acts of defection (because, given such a signal, the partner has a
positive and non-negligible probability of being a committed agent and defecting in the current match). Hence,
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a deviator who always defects outperforms the incumbent, since she induces normal agents to cooperate against
her, and obtains the high payoff of 1 + g in most rounds of the repeated game.
Part 2: Assume that g ≤ l, k ≥ 2, and δ > ll+1 . Let γ = lδ·(l+1) ∈ (0, 1). Let 0 < α < α < 1 be two
probabilities satisfying the condition that the ratio α/α is sufficiently large (as further specified below). Consider
a homogeneous group of committed agents who follow the following strategy sC :
1. defect with probability α if they either (1) defected in the last round, or (2) defected at least twice in the
last k − 1 rounds; and
2. defect with probability α otherwise.
Consider the perturbed environment
(
(G, k, δ) ,
({
sC
})
, n
)
, for a sufficiently small n > 0. Consider a homo-
geneous population of normal agents who play according to the following strategy sN :
1. cooperate if the agent defected in any of the last min (t, k − 1) rounds;
2. otherwise (i.e., the agent cooperated in all of the last min (t, k − 1) rounds):
(a) cooperate if the partner has never defected in the last min (t, k − 1) rounds;
(b) defect if the partner defected at least twice in the last min (t, k − 1) rounds;
(c) cooperate if the partner defected only once in the last min (t, k − 1) rounds and did not defect in the
last round; and
(d) defect with probability qt if the partner defected only in the last round, where t is the current round,
and the sequence (qt)t≥1 is defined recursively below.
Let q1 = γ. The value of each qt for t ≥ 2 is determined such that a normal agent is indifferent between defecting
and cooperating in round t−1 conditional on the events that (1) the agent did not defect in any of the previous
k − 1 rounds, and (2) the agent observes the signal (c, ..., c, d) (i.e., the partner defected in the last round and
cooperated in all of the previous observed interactions). Here we are relying on the one-deviation principle; in
the next period the agent will have a track record (c, c, c, ...c, d), which means that the agent should cooperate.
The gain from defecting in round t−1 is equal to l ·µt−1 +g · (1− µt−1), where µt−1 is the probability that a
random partner defects conditional on the union of the two events above. Such a defection induces an expected
loss of δ · (l + 1) · qt +O () for the agent in the next round (with a probability of (1− ) the partner in the next
round is normal, and in this case he will defect with probability qt instead of cooperating, which will induce a
loss of δ (l + 1) for the agent. In the round after that the agent will have a track record (c, c, c, ...c, d, c) which
means that the agent should cooperate again. The partner, if normal, will cooperate for sure with the agent.
Thus, an agent is indifferent between the two actions in round t− 1 when observing (c, ..., c, d) iff
l · µt−1 + g · (1− µt−1) = δ · (l + 1) · qt +O ()⇔ qt = l · µt−1 + g · (1− µt−1)
δ · (l + 1) +O () .
Observe that the qt’s have a uniform bound strictly below one, i.e., ∀t ∈ N, 0 < qt < γ = lδ·(l+1) < 1. Let
(βt)t∈N be the average probability with which normal agents defect in round t. Observe that β1 = 0, and that
βt can be bounded as follows for any t ∈ N:
βt ≤ qt · βt−1 +O () < γ · βt−1 +O () .
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This implies that βt is bounded from above by a converging geometric sequence, and, thus, βt < O()1−γ for each
t. This implies that the population state (sN , 1sN ) induces full cooperation in the limit → 0.
Let Pr
(
SC | (c, ..., c, d) , t) be the probability that the partner is committed conditional on the agent observing
signal (c, ..., c, d) in round t. Let Pr
(
(c, ..., c, d) , t|SC) (Pr ((c, ..., c, d) , t|sN )) be the probability that an agent
observes the signal (c, ..., c, d) in round t conditional on the partner being committed (normal). Observe that
Pr
(
(c, ..., c, d) , t|SC) > αk (because a committed agent plays each pure action with a probability of at least
α in each round), and that Pr
(
(c, ..., c, d) , t|SC) < suptβt < O()1−γ (because the average probability in which
a normal agent defects is at most suptβt. By using Bayes’ rule we can give a uniform minimal bound to
Pr
(
SC | (c, ..., c, d) , t) as follows:
 · αk
 · αk + O()1−γ
< Pr
(
SC | (c, ..., c, d) , t) < 1.
We assume that the ratio α/α is sufficiently large such that α · Pr (SC | (c, ..., c, d) , t) > α in each round t.
Recall the definition from above and then observe that µt−1 = Pr
(
SC | (c, ..., c, d) , t) · α¯ ∈ (α, α¯) for each round
t. Recall that the probabilities (qt)t∈N have been defined such that each normal agent is indifferent between the
two actions when (1) she observes the signal (c, ..., c, d), and (2) she did not defect in any of the previous k − 1
rounds. Next we show that the normal agents have strict preferences in all other cases. Specifically, the fact
that g ≤ l (resp., g < l) implies that each normal agent:
1. strictly prefers to cooperate if she defected exactly once in the last k− 1 rounds. This is so because if the
agent defects in the current round it induces any normal opponent in the next round to defect for sure
(instead of cooperating). This implies that defection in the current round induces an indirect loss of at
least δ · (l + 1) > l > g, which is larger than the agent’s direct gain from defection.18
2. weakly (resp., strictly) prefers to cooperate if she observes the signal (c, ..., c); in this case, the partner is
most likely a normal agent who is going to cooperate, and the direct gain from defecting (g) is outweighed
by the larger indirect loss in the next round (δ · (l + 1) · qt +O () > g).
3. weakly (resp., strictly) prefers to defect if (1) the partner defected at least twice in the last k rounds, and
(2) the agent did not defect in any of the last k− 1 rounds; in this case the partner is most likely to be a
committed agent and to defect with a high probability of α > µt−1 in each round t and, thus, defection
is the agent’s unique best reply.
4. weakly (resp., strictly) prefers to cooperate if the partner defected only once in the last k rounds, and this
defection did not happen in the last round; in this case the probability that the partner is going to defect
in the current match is at most α < µt−1 for each round t and, thus, cooperation is the agent’s unique
best reply.
This implies that the population state
({
sN
})
is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed environment for
a sufficiently small .
18Private histories in which a normal agent has defected more than once in the last k−1 rounds never happen on the equilibrium
path. If one wishes to turn the above-described equilibrium into a sequential equilibrium (where agents best reply also off the
equilibrium path), then one needs to make a stronger assumption on δ, namely, that δk−1 > l
l+1 . This is so because after the
off-equilibrium history in which an agent has defected in all the last k − 1 rounds, an additional defection in the current round t
induces a future normal partner to defect instead of cooperating only in round t + k − 1 (because normal partners will defect in
rounds t+ 1, ... ,t+ k − 2, regardless of the agent’s behavior in round t).
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F Cheap Talk and Equilibrium Selection (Online Publication)
Appendix D shows that both perfect equilibrium outcomes, namely, cooperation and defection, satisfy the
refinement of evolutionary stability. In this section we discuss how the stability analysis changes if one introduces
pre-play “cheap-talk” communication in our setup.
For concreteness, we focus on observation of actions. As in the standard setup of normal-form games
(without observation of past actions), the introduction of cheap talk induces different equilibrium selection
results, depending on whether or not deviators have unused signals to use as secret handshakes (see, e.g.,
Robson, 1990; Schlag, 1993; Kim and Sobel, 1995). If one assumes that the set of cheap-talk signals is finite,
and all signals are costless, then cheap talk has little effect on the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes (as any
perfect equilibrium of the game without cheap talk can be implemented as an equilibrium with cheap talk in
which the incumbents send all signals with positive probability).
In what follows we focus on a different case, in which there are slightly costly signals that, due to their
positive cost, are not used unless they yield a benefit. In this setup our results should be adapted as follows.
1. Offensive games: No stable state exists. Both defection and cooperation are only “quasi-stable”; the
population state occasionally changes between theses two states, based on the occurrence of rare random
experimentations. The argument is adapted from Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001).
2. Defensive games (and k ≥ 2): The introduction of cheap talk destabilizes all non-efficient equilibria,
leaving cooperation as the unique stable outcome. The argument is adapted from Robson (1990).
In what follows we only briefly sketch the arguments for these results, since a formal presentation would be very
lengthy, and the contribution is somewhat limited given that similar arguments have already been presented in
the literature.
Following Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001), we modify the environment by endowing agents with the ability
to send a slightly costly signal φ (called the secret handshake). An agent has to pay a small cost c either to send
φ to her partner or to observe whether the partner has sent φ to her. In addition, we still assume that each
agent observes k ≥ 2 past actions of the partner. Let ξ be the initial small frequency of a group of experimenting
agents (called mutants) who deviate jointly. We assume that O () ·O (ξ) < c < O (ξ), i.e., that the small cost of
the secret handshake is smaller than the initial share of mutants, but larger than the product of the two small
shares of the mutants (O (ξ)) and the committed agents (O ()). To simplify the analysis we also assume that
the committed agents do not use the secret handshake
Consider a population that starts at the defection equilibrium, in which all normal agents defect regardless of
the observed actions and do not use signal φ. Consider a small group of ξ mutants (“cooperative handshakers”)
who send the signal φ, and cooperate iff the partner has sent φ as well. These mutants outperform the
incumbents: they achieve ξ additional points by cooperating among themselves, which outweighs the cost of
2 · c for using the secret handshake. Thus, assuming a payoff-monotonic selection dynamics, the mutants take
over the population and destabilize the defective equilibrium. If the underlying game is offensive, then there is
no other candidate to be a stable population state. Thus, cooperation can be sustained only until new mutants
arrive (“defective handshakers”) who use the secret handshake and always defect. These mutants outperform
the cooperative handshakers, and would take over the population. Finally, a third group of mutants who always
defect without using the secret handshake can take the population back to the starting point.
If the underlying game is defensive, then there is a sequence of mutants who can take the population into
the cooperative equilibrium characterized in the main text. Specifically, the second group of mutants (the ones
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after the cooperative handshakers) include agents who send only φ, but instead of incurring the small cost c of
observing the partner’s secret handshake, they base their behavior on the partner’s observed actions, namely,
they play some combination of the strategies s1 and s2. This second group of mutants would take over the
population because the cost they save by not checking the secret handshake outweighs the small loss of O ()
incurred from not defecting against committed partners. Finally, a third group of mutants who do not send the
secret handshake, and follow strategies s1 and s2, can take over the population (by saving the cost of sending φ),
and induce the perfect cooperative equilibrium of the main text. This equilibrium remains stable also with the
option of using the secret handshake because (1) mutants who defect when observing m = 0 are outperformed
due to similar arguments to those in the main model, and (2) mutants who send the secret handshake, and
always cooperate when observing φ (also when m > 2), are outperformed, as the cost of the secret handshake
c outweighs the gain of O (ξ) ·O ().
G Example: Equilibrium with Partial Cooperation (Online Publication)
The following example demonstrates the existence of a non-regular perfect equilibrium of an offensive Prisoner’s
Dilemma, in which players cooperate with positive probability.
Example 5 (Non-regular Perfect Equilibrium with Partial Cooperation). Consider the environment (GO, 1)
where GO is an offensive Prisoner’s Dilemma game with g = 2.3, l = 1.7 (see Table 1), and each agent observes
a single action sampled from the partner’s behavior. Let s∗ be the strategy that defects with probability 10%
after observing cooperation (i.e., m = 0) and defects with probability 81.7% (numerical values in this example
are rounded to 0.1%) after observing a defection (i.e., m = 1). Let q∗ denote the average probability of defection
in a homogeneous population of agents who follow strategy s∗. The value of q∗ is calculated as follows:
q∗ = (1− q∗) · 10% + q∗ · 81.7% ⇒ q∗ = 35.3%. (27)
Eq. (27) holds because an agent defects in either of the following exhaustive cases: (1) she observes cooperation
(which happens with a probability of 1 − q∗) and then she defects with probability 10%, or (2) she observes
defection (which happens with a probability of q∗) and then she defects with probability 81.7%. This implies that
the unique consistent signal θ∗ of a homogeneous population in which all agents follow s∗ satisfies θ∗ (1) = 35.3%
(i.e., agents defect in 35.3% of the observed interactions).
Next, observe that an agent who follows strategy s∗ defects with probability
p (q) = q · 81.7% + (1− q) · 10%
when being matched with a partner who defects with an average probability of q. This implies that the payoff
of a deviator (Alice) who defects with an average probability of q is
piq (({s∗} , 1s∗ , θ∗)) = q · (1− p (q)) · (1 + g) + (1− q) · p (q) · (−l) + (1− q) · (1− p (q)) · 1.
This is because with a probability of q · (1− p (q)) only Alice defects, with a probability of (1− q) · p (q) only
Alice cooperates, and with a probability of (1− q) · (1− p (q)) both players cooperate. By calculating the
FOC one can show that q = q∗ = 35.3% is the probability of defection that uniquely maximizes the payoff of a
deviator. This implies that ({s∗} , 1s∗ , 35.3%) is a Nash equilibrium of the (non-regular) perturbed environments
(G, k, {s∗} , 1s∗ , ) for any  ∈ (0, q), which implies that ({s∗} , 1s∗ , θ∗) is a (non-regular) perfect equilibrium.
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The above perfect equilibrium relies on a very particular set of commitment strategies in which all committed
agents happen to play the same strategy as the normal agents. This cannot hold in a regular set of commitment
strategies, in which different commitment strategies defect with different average probabilities. Given this
regularity, it must be the case that the conditional probability that the partner is going to defect is higher after
he observes a defection (m = 1) than after he observes a cooperation (m = 0). This implies that a deviator
(Alice) who defects with a probability of 35.3% regardless of the signal will strictly outperform the incumbents.
This is because the incumbents behave the same against Alice (as she has the same average probability of
defection as the incumbents), while Alice defects with higher probability against partners who are more likely
to cooperate (i.e., after she observes m = 0), which implies that due to the offensiveness of the game (i.e., g > l),
Alice achieves a strictly higher payoff than the incumbents.
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